fiat money

...then maybe you'll believe a published economist. Prof Steve Horowitz explains exactly what I have been trying to explain about the causes of the housing and debt bubble and thus the current recession. Or watch it here:

According to the BBC, today both Tories and Lib Dems will formally outline their current plans for dealing with the regulation of the banking sector in a post election world. Neither, it seems, are prepared to think "outside the box" as that early century cliche went: the Tories looking at returning banking oversight to the Bank of England, whence it came a few years ago, the Lib Dems more firm on plans to break up the biggest banks, starting at least with the ones in de facto public ownership. However, one thing we can be pretty sure of: neither will be proposing the single most important possible change to banking that would do the most to stabilize the money system and longer term the economy...Free Banking.

As a concept it's pretty simple: Free Banking is where banks, and potentially other organizations such as communities, trading companies and so on, issue their own currencies instead of trading in the "national" currency of the territory in which they are operating. These currencies compete against each other for users. The value of each rests solely on the soundness of the business practices of the organization issuing them. If one bank/issuer over-extends itself all the others who would normally accept their currency at par with their own (say when a business customer of theirs tries to deposit them at the end of each day) will want to pay less for them and the message will soon get round that the over-extended bank needs to change its business practices, its risk profile say, or risk complete devaluation of its issued currency. There are also lots of other mechanisms that, in a free market, but not a fiat system, would come into play to ensure the currency issuers play responsibly.

The system we have today, fiat currency "guaranteed" by the nation is whose name it is issued, is the result of a long term grab for power by the state. Why would they do that, in a market that functioned quite well? Well, there are profits to be had in issuing currency - so called "seignorage". However in the current system where fiat money tends to be introduced via lending by the commercial banks regulated to do so this seignorage profit has reduced, and has also been passed to those issuing banks rather than to the state. The big reason is inflation. We take it as axiomatic that inflation can be a good thing, if you are in debt. With your future repayments more or less fixed in numerical terms if you can inflate the money supply your payments will tend to fall in real terms with time.

Who are the biggest single borrowers in our economy? Well usually the government. So the government can inflate away the running costs of their debt. Well, okay, says you, but it also eats into the costs of everyone else's debt too, doesn't it - so we all benefit from inflation, right? Wrong. Lots of us may well be in debt, but after many decades of inflation and only a few of burgeoning private debt, the lenders have become savvy to this. How many of you are now on variable rate mortgages? Government induced inflation really assists really long term borrowers on fixed rates (ie gilt issuers predominantly).

And on that subject, on the other side of the coin, if you pardon the pun, inflation erodes savings. All of us need some of those, even if we are in debt - for example for our retirement. Inflation keeps eating into our pension funds - firms and returns have to grow faster in monetary terms just to maintain the value of our savings. But equally, if inflation undermines our savings, so it also undermines the money we have in our pockets now. If we think the prices are going to go up, we want to buy more now. Inflation actually drives us into more debt, transferring more in interest from less well off to the better off lenders, so we can buy now before the prices rise.

But inflation also distorts in all sorts of other ways - if it is more difficult for us to work out as individuals whether we should borrow to buy that new Hi-fi today and pay the interest, or wait until we don't need to borrow because it will still be there at the same, or perhaps a lower price, how much more difficult is it for people who have to make borrowing decisions about investing in capital goods? Inflation corrupts the signals that prices are sending to manufacturers for example - they don't know necessarily whether they are getting a better price because of inflation or because their product is in greater demand.

Since the US finally adopted central bank run currency, followed by a fully fiat monetary system a few years later, the state has overseen a devaluation in the currency of over 98% - roughly a period of a hundred years; the Federal Reserve system was established in 1913. But this most recent decade shows the problem at work perfectly and the government's part in it. At least until 1997 the government, through the regular collaboration between the Treasury and the Bank of England, was instrumental in setting the base rate as we call it here. That is used to create a signal to all the banks who are regulated to lend in sterling that they should lend more, if the base rate goes down, or lend less, perhaps call in loans, if the base rate goes up.

After the political turmoil caused by the events of "Black Wednesday" when speculation against the pound led the government to raise interest rates three times and to 15% at one point, we were left with hundreds of thousands of households who could no longer afford their mortgages. A housing slump ensued and led to a policy for the next few years of keeping interest rates as low as possible - lower probably than the economy deserved. Just as the housing market was getting back to relative values from before that crash, another asset was bubbling - the "dot com" stocks and shares.

When that bubble burst, there was a great concern in Treasuries on both sides of the Atlantic that the burst would turn to recession (and indeed it did in the US). Gordon Brown in the UK was so concerned that Labour's first term in twenty years would end with a recession that again base rates were kept artificially low, signaling to the commercial banks that were part of this cosy central-commercial bank cartel that they should lend even more, even more irresponsibly, and we had the housing price bubble that has resulted in the current economic carnage. All the way up that price bubble the least well off are encouraged to transfer more of their wealth to the lenders and now, all the way down, that cosy relationship means that the banks, the lenders, are the ones being baled out while everyone else will suffer vast capital losses with no compensation.

And finally, central banking and its bastard daughter inflation kills. Literally. You'll notice that the history of central banking has been closely related to when government wanted to borrow to fight wars. In the past century, more of this has been done via inflation than by direct government borrowing. If there's an inflationary surplus already in the economy, go to war, destroy some capital goods, and with it some human capital and all of a sudden there are things to spend that surplus inflationary money on. If you are already n a war, perhaps an unpopular one, and you cannot finance it via extra taxes or selling debt, inflate, inflate, inflate and you'll be able to buy up your war-goods before everyone else sees the inflation in the form of a reduction in the value of their money.

So, which of Vince, or George, will take such a brave step? Of course, we know the answer - what they really want of course is for themselves to be in charge of this vast power inflation gives. But wouldn't it be great if just for once, politicians made the right policy decision for us not them.

In a quick diversion from my task of preparing a business plan to rescue Oxfordshire's distressed home-owners and businesses from the worst effects of the state-created credit crunch I noticed the other day, in a rare foray into blogging himself, a Lib Dem Federal Policy Committee member, Geoffrey Payne, has been reading Vince Cable's new book about the credit crisis, The Storm. Geoffrey is one of those Lib Dems with a visceral hatred of anything "economically liberal", which he will always equate to something akin to "what Maggie and Ronnie did".  He notes that Vince quotes Herbert Spencer, saying that it shows how little Vince thinks about "extreme libertarians":

I have read the book and would heartedly recommend it. I agree with most of it. Because it is short there are obvious gaps - the chapter on Malthus is rather short and inconclusive which is a shame as I for one think it ought to be the most important part.

However there is no doubt what he thinks about extreme Libertarians;

"(quote from Herbert Spencer) 'The ultimate result of shielding man from the efects of his folly is to people the world with fools' . This approach was influencial in the years of the Great Crash, and it helped inform the advice given to president Hoover by his treasury secretary, Andrew Mellon: to do nothing. '[Panic] will purge the rottenness out of the system ... People will work harder and live a more moral life ... enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people.' Since Hoover and Mellon emerged as the fools who precipitated the Great Depression, their abstemiousness become seriously unfashionable", page 46, The Storm. [From Left Liberal: Vince Cable lays into Libertarians]

Now, I don't suppose for one minute that Geoffrey has bothered to read the Spencer essay from which this quote comes. I hope Vince has. For in "State-tamperings with money and banks" which can be found in Vol 3 of his "Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative" available on the web courtesy of the Online Library of Liberty Spencer produces a fantastic critique of state controlled money systems and how they will inevitably exacerbate bubbles and crashes.

Allowing for the slightly convoluted Victorian English prose style, it is a fabulous analysis of why, as Hayek concluded a hundred and tenwty years later, or as both Mises and Rothbard have concluded in their ciriticism of the Federal Reserve system, the state is incompetent in the running of currency.

What the government is doing by quantitative easing is abolishing the rule of law and its part in enforcing contracts. What they are saying by creating additional money into the system is that you no longer need to pay all the debts on contracts you have issued, because here's some extra money-tokens to cover them. And that if banks were allowed to run under free banking these crises would never been as deep or as pervasive as they are through manipulation of the currency by the state and the banking system by regulation.

It is a brilliant exposition of the origins and effects of what we know of as "moral hazard". And that the effects of us being shielded from that moral hazard by state offered, ultimately worthless, guarantees, is to populate the banking system with the sort of fools we have witnessed, from Fred the Shred to Adam Applegarth.

I encourage you to read Spencer's essay (it runs to about 23 pages of one and a half lines width print on A4). If we are to avoid this sort of crisis again, we need to learn from the likes of him, and Hayek, and Mises and Rothbard, about how these crises come about through the state currency system. I am very proud that English liberals understood this a hundred and fifty years ago, and equally ashamed that politicians ever since have believed themselves immune to these facts of economic life.

In the monetary crisis of the late seventies when Hayek wrote the essay I linked to earlier about privatizing the money supply he thought that the then current generation of senior bankers would be too dyed in he wool of the prevailing system to become so innovative as to suggest and work up his radical suggestion. He pinned any hope he had on the younger generation of up and coming bankers, unencumbered by the past, who might have such imagination. Sadly, those young bankers then are the ones who have been in charge for the past decade or so, and they do appear to have had the slightest flash of inspiration or willingness to suggest radical alternatives.

And the current crisis shows why. It would impose far more discipline on commercial bankers if they had to be responsible for the success or failure of their own commercial currencies. If they did not have the fall-back of a state, able to tax its citizens for generations into the future, to save their businesses because what they are playing with in vast amounts are currencies that have to be supported by those states, they would have to be much more careful about taking on the enormous effectively unquantifiable risks they have done.  Better still if they also had unlimited liability.

And from the state's point of view it suits governments to have a currency that they themselves can manipulate when it suits them, no matter that such an ability distorts business and personal investment decisions of their citizens. As I have argued before, this crisis started with politicians trying to use monetary policy to achieve political aims - and not even terribly tangible political aims at that - we're not talking about public spending on useful public goods, but the more vague "feel good factor" that would keep people voting for the party they thought was capable of "managing" the economy well.

In both cases the losers are ordinary people and businesses. The only real winners are the few that have clawed their way up the greasy pole of corporate and political power.

There is now, possibly, only a month left to influence the measures that will be put into place to rescue the financial system and try to prevent similar excessive booms and busts happening again (small ones, as the Austrians know, are useful and natural, like storms bringing down dead tree branches, as they flush out economic inefficiencies). The next month, before the G20 starts to really put pen to paper in London on 2nd April, is the time for the new adventurous young bankers and economists to stake out their ground, or be lost again for another generation till the next time this market typhoon comes round again.

Sadly, as I watched Stephen Hester's interview last week on Channel Four News with Jon Snow, I can hold out little hope. Admittedly, he's in a bank that is in a lot of trouble and probably not the best placed to demand innovations, but if he's representative of a more general pedestrian conservative thinking in bank board-rooms there's nobody really suggesting anything new. Perhaps the two relatively less damaged banks, HSBC and Santander, could lead the way. They don't need legislation - at least not in the UK so far as I can see. They could start issuing corporate scrip, have the client network to distribute it globally and to bring together trading communities of their business customers to accept their scrip.

In the Great Depression communities, companies and mutual associations did just that and, as in Worgl in Austria and in countless American towns and cities, showed that we can continue to trade, to create wealth and maintain consumption without the national currencies that were in meltdown. We can do so again, and the world would be a better place for it.

Most of you know I have little truck with bankers at the best of times, let alone after they have comprehensively trashed our entire way of life(!), but to be fair to them, I've been watching some coverage of the Westminster Banking Trials, and it made me wonder whether our glorious representatives might have actually started from the wrong place.

They have passed the buck to the banking industry and not looked at the state's much more important contribution to creating this crisis. Without learning this, they will be doomed to make similar mistakes in future and cause, one day, an even bigger crisis that they will not be able to stop.

And it's all the more worrying since the evidence of government's responsibility for this crisis was given to their very committee on 20th March, 2007 - so nearly two years ago now, in the Treasury Select Committee's investigation into the first ten years of Bank of England "independence" and the Monetary Policy Committee. And with evidence, it is a relatively simple matter to construct an alternative view of the credit crunch in which the over-extension of the banking system is a direct result of public policy, at least in the UK anyway.

Eddie George, the former Bank of England Governor in oral evidence to the Select Committee, and picked up in the next day's Independent, said that the political incentive in the late nineties/early noughties was to keep the cost of borrowing down far enough to keep people borrowing against property and spending on imports to prevent the UK economy going into a mini-recession following the dotCom bubble.

Rising house prices make the majority who are owner-occupiers feel good. Plenty of credit and spending makes the country collectively "feel good". Staying out of recession, even just a short one, allows Gordon Brown, Chancellor, to keep banging on about his mantra of having abolished boom and bust, and having presided over the longest period of economic growth in recorded history.

Now let's have a think about Bank of England "independence" for a second: the Bank has "independence" insofar as its one defined job is to maintain a government set target inflation rate. The Bank is solely responsible for monetary policy to achieve that. Not, categorically not, macro-economic policy in general. So the enjoinder to keep people "feeling good" about the economy must have come from Downing Street.

So, having given this instruction, the City reacted in the only possible way. Clearly the Bank of England could not be as brazen as to pump high-powered government created money into the system. So the only way this policy objective could be implemented was to sell more debt. Either more debt to the same people who had already debt, or new debt to people who weren't in debt. And the only asset class that could bear this sort of debt creation without itself feeding through into inflation was housing.

So, on the technical signal of low base rates from the Bank of England the banks swung into lending mode - after all, they make money when they are lending. And when one group of people has had their fill of mortgage debt, and you cannot sell them any more, you have to find new customers. You need to start selling mortgages to people you would previously not have considered a good risk. You need to offload that more risky lending so you invent a collateralized debt obligation to sell that risk to many different types of investor. Markets get more and more jittery and start wanting to insure and hedge their positions and create credit default swaps.

On the demand side, with rising property prices, as I have written before, far be it from a classic "bubble" mentality where irrational optimism takes the crowd into ever more irrational market situations, people who were aspiring owners who could not afford to buy and faced with rising rents apparently only heading north for the foreseeable future, had to take ever riskier loans in a desperation to get on a housing ladder being consistently talked up by government and the fourth estate in equal measure.

Now, this doesn't let bankers off the hook of course: they should have said when they knew the policy was untenable without taking extra-ordinary risks. But with a few honourable exceptions few in the political arena were complaining too much at the "feel good factor" at work despite mounting evidence of unsustainable personal debt. But if we are going to learn from this crisis, we must understand that the "original sin" in all of this was political policy. How can we expect politicians to fix it?

If this analysis is correct, we can surely say that Gordon Brown and the government of the late nineties is responsible for the most devastating episode of capital destruction on record.

Some of you will know I have long had an interest in money. Not in the sense that I have lots of it, though it would be nice if I did, but in how it works, what it is supposed to do, and how well it does it. I had long ago predicted a catastrophe in the current system, believing it to be systemically flawed, and have long hoped that when it came it would be terminal.

It was not a terribly learned or technically sophisticated analysis, and I have had to re-think lots of it - especially the idea that the system was flawed primarily because "banks create money out of nothing". I now acknowledge that they do not create actual money - but maintain that the more or less unfettered ability, at least in most "normal" market circumstances, to create "purchasing power" in the form of pseudo money credit is just as much of a problem. And I understand that the problem is less one sided and is, as has been seen recently, shared by the banks just as much as the users of that inflated purchasing power since when the crunch comes the banks have to scramble to get their hands on some of the real stuff to cover their liabilities.

If my previous analysis of the problems was insufficient, I can at least say that I have not particularly plumped for one solution or another.

I have been wary of the "gold bugs" though feel I understand them at least a lot better having read Murray Rothbard's "What Has the Government Done to Our Money?" (available as a downloadable PDF as well).

I have flirted with the idea that government can not only manage a fiat money system well enough but benefit from it in the form of Seignorage, following the work of people like James Robertson and Joseph Huber's "Creating New Money" (also available as a downloadable PDF).

I have even tried, in vain I am afraid (but I have to say largely because of the acerbic and antagonistic attitude of its main contemporary proponents), to grasp the ideas of Major C H Douglas and the Social Credit movement - after all, it is probably the only "monetary system" to have held political power in its own right in various parts of the developed world.

And I have been attracted to less formal ideas of money such as documented by our own David Boyle in his various books on subjects such as time banking and local or complementary currencies.

But probably the main reason none of these ideas has me fully committed is that the most important thing you can learn about money from even a cursory study of it is that it is and has been through history, an incredibly flexible and simple concept. The very fact that there are so many theories about it and what it ought to be, how it ought to work, is testament to this. And in response to this, my instinct is that our monetary systems should be more flexible and simpler. We have created a vast and complex leviathan for something which essentially performs a few very simple tasks. And we have to ask "cui bono"?

And today I got an email from the Mises Institute advertising a little book with an essay by F A Hayek, whose ideas on competing private currencies I have long thought of as an obvious solution, called "A Free Market Monetary System":

A Free-Market Monetary System and The Pretense of Knowledge

I urge you to read it right through - it's only twenty or so short pages and does a far better job than I could ever do at explaining why the current system is utterly unfit for purpose, outrageously disadvantageous to the ordinary person or business and completely skewed towards those who seek power and ultimately complete power over others.

It was of course written during the last really major monetary crisis of the mid to late seventies, but I find this conclusion on the urgency of this sort of measure so prescient and apt it is almost chilling:

We have not got that much time. We are now facing the likelihood of the most unpleasant political development, largely as a result of an economic policy with which we have already gone very far.

My proposal is not, as I would wish, merely a sort of standby arrangement of which I could say we must work it out intellectually to have it ready when the present system completely collapses. It is not merely an emergency plan. I think it is very urgent that it become rapidly understood that there is no justification in history for the existing position of a government monopoly of issuing money. It has never been proposed on the ground that government will give us better money than anybody else could. It has always, since the privilege of issuing money was first explicitly represented as a Royal prerogative, been advocated because the power to issue money was essential for the finance of the government—not in order to give us good money, but in order to give to government access to the tap where it can draw the money it needs by manufacturing it. That, ladies and gentlemen, is not a method by which we can hope ever to get good money. To put it into the hands of an institution which is protected against competition, which can force us to accept the money, which is subject to incessant political pressure, such an authority will not ever again give us good money.

I think we ought to start fairly soon, andI think we must hope that some of the more enterprising and intelligent financiers will soon begin to experiment with such a thing. The great obstacle is that it involves such great changes in the whole financial structure that, and I am saying this from the experience of many discussions, no senior banker, who understands only the present banking system, can really conceive how such a new system would work, and he would not dare to risk and experiment with it. I think we will have to count on a few younger and more flexible brains to begin and show that such a thing can he done.

Thirty years on, not only is this more urgent than ever before - even if the remains of the current system can be rebuilt, it will be so hemmed in by people and institutions trying to ensure, against hope from my perspective, that the present messiness can never be repeated, that trade and growth will suffer disproportionately, but the currently proposed cures will harm far more than they benefit in any case.

Further, because of the huge changes in global communications I have written about previously that have happened even since Hayek wrote that, we are now in an era in which money can be even more flexible than ever - we can form communities of trust not based around nations for example but common interests in diverse geographic markets. This is not just a matter of urgency to get us out of present problems, but of great opportunity - to take an epochal leap into a new sort of a globalized economic system that favours ordinary people and their economic actions over the rich and powerful.

Of course for this reason alone it may never be allowed to happen, but if our collective governments, who answer of course, in theory at least, to us, the mass of us and not just the few, were not so fixated on some past fiction they want to save they could do it. If Obama really meant what he said about "government that works" he would recognize that the government monopoly of money creation does not work for the benefit of the mass of people government are supposed to serve and be really bold. But even if not, we can all begin closer to home.

Books referenced in this blog (if you want to buy them and do so through these links, I'll get a little money from each!):

"Creating New Money" (Joseph Huber, James Robertson)

Money is not wealth. Wealth only exists in real things that people produce and you consume, or more properly take pleasure in owning. Unless you are a very sad person whose pleasure is in counting and admiring a pile of bits of crinkly notes, money is only valuable insofar as it allows the person who has it to buy things, goods or services that add to their store of wealth.

For most people, money is just a unit of accounting that tells them they have sold their labour (or something else) for a certain amount of wealth’s worth that they can use later to buy some real wealth. It gets over the problem of so called “coincidence of demand” – that at the time you sell your labour or goods you may not in that instant want something the person buying it from you has to offer.

In a world of uncertainty, it is prudent, if we are able to, most of the time at least, to hold a little bit of money in reserve so that we can eke it out and survive if for some reason we are unable to get more of it before we need to pay our bills, buy more food and otherwise fulfil the basic needs of life. That’s just what prudent companies do to ensure they can pay you every month and buy things to sell before you come along to buy them.

But really “saving”, putting something away for that ever-looming “rainy day”, is where money (“cash”) falls down as an asset class. And in doing so it does immense damage to us all – our financial fortunes, our environment, our society.

In the context of establishing our idea of a “Community Finance Partnership” a friend and I have been reading up on various community finance networks that sprung up at the time of the Great Depression. And I believe I have finally had an epiphany in my understanding of “usury”.

Many of the groups and systems I have been looking at, formed during the Depression to help make up for the lack of circulating currency which was making a bad situation worse, worked on the understanding that charging or paying interest was itself the major problem that had led to the “credit crunch” of the time.

Interest bearing cash tries to turn money from being a means of exchange and unit of account into something fundamentally different – a store of value. It encourages the hoarding of cash balances, which are then not available to be spent in the real productive economy.

The charging of interest on loans means that the borrower has to acquire more money than they borrowed in order to pay off the principal and the interest. We have a tiny amount of non-interest bearing “money” in our system. In the UK, prior at least to the recent troubles, this amounted to only about £50bn – in the form of issued notes and coins. All the other purchasing power in our accounts was created as interest bearing debt and so over 97% of our purchasing power needs repaying at some point, with interest.

The JAK bank in Sweden, which has its origins in a similar Depression-era Danish venture, calculates that up to between 30% and 40% of everything we spend goes on paying this embedded interest committed to by all the borrowers in the supply chain of the goods and services we are purchasing and have been created in the past. This represents a huge transfer of wealth from those who have little, to those who own the financial institutions that create this debt-based purchasing power.

In such a system also, inflation is virtually guaranteed, as it helps those in debt (most often governments telling us they are acting in our name) reduce the value of their debt by reducing the purchasing power of those who hold current purchasing power unencumbered by debt. This is a transfer of wealth from those prudent enough to operate within their means to those who don’t.

It is a vicious cycle at the centre of our economic lives that allows the rich and powerful, including states and bankers, to manipulate our purchasing power for their ends rather than ours. If we did not have to finance this 30-40% embedded interest then, not only would our purchasing power hold its value better, but we’d have 30-40% more of it, for the same amount of labour sold, with which to purchase real wealth and get closer to financial independence.

Money is a human creation, and the way it operates can be changed by human intervention. If we do not change it now, in the process of rebuilding the financial system that has just crashed, we are doomed, absolutely inevitably, to repeat this crisis in the future. And we should not be afraid to demand such change. After all, it affects the vast majority of us negatively at the moment and only benefits a tiny minority. It is a test of our democracy if you like that we must rebuild the system in a way that works for the majority rather than against the majoroity.

...it's more like 2% of our money that is actually real, tangible stuff.

You're lucky if you happen to have some of the real stuff in your hands in fact. Why shouldn't the good old coin counterfeiter have a go. The Masters of the Universe who are at this very moment plunging us all into financial depression are the ones who are really the counterfeiters. And on an unimaginable scale. So unimaginable that we would rather believe it's not been happening.

The fact is that what we think of as pounds and pence are really only represented in the real world by, at the last calculation, about £45bn worth of notes and coins. Yes, that's the sum total of what the state has ever issued in our name.

But add up what we all have in our bank accounts and the humungous numbers represented by our outstanding mortgage balances and so on, there are more like £1,800bn or one point eight trillion.

Is it any wonder that this house of cards is teetering? And the fraudulent pound coins and notes that sometimes inconvenience us when a shop assistant tells us we can't use the money we thought we had are only the visible manifestation of a fraud so much grander we'd prefer not to think it exists.

Again, I'm starting a new post to respond to some very interesting comments by Tim Carpenter. My inept attempt at a Drupal template means it's almost possible to follow a thread of comments and especially given this is going to be another long response I think it deserves an airing on its own.

For anyone coming new to this debate, it follows on from my original "three point plan" for equity and economic justice and some clarifications and responses I gave yesterday to comments on that original by Tim Carpenter, Head of Policy at the Libertarian Party UK.

Tim, thanks for taking the time to respond. However I think we are, as a colleague used to say to me "talking past each one another". Paul Lockett has put it all a deal more eloquently than myself , and for that, and if I have caused any confusion, apologies.

I am a geo-libertarian (of the "geo-mutualist" variety if you will). The main thing you seem not to have appreciated is that in calling for the "Single Tax" I mean just that - the community/state can only take economic rent on the land resources within its jurisdiction and has no call on incomes or trade. As I understand it this is the "purist Georgist" position.

The ideal 'state' would be limited to collecting the rent and distributing it all as a dividend to citizens for the reasons Paul outlined. "Commonwealth" - you are right, it's lazy, I should put a space between "common" and "wealth"! Economic rent from the finite natural resources we all require to share is "common wealth" and should be collected as such and distributed as fully as possible whilst every other tax is a tariff.

Tim: "1. When I say who defines the value of your land, you say "why does anyone need to decide", yet immediately go on to talk about collecting the tax! Someone DOES decide the taxable value and that affects the actual value. Can you not see that?"

No, the market sets a location's value. It does it all the time at the moment. And it will continue to do so in an LVT system. Even in a "100% LVT" system. If a location is appreciating in value, buyers will be prepared to pay a premium over last year's rent bill and vice versa, in a falling market sellers will effectively have to be prepared to pay someone to take the rent bill off them. The following year's rent bill will reflect that premium or discount by going up or down respectively.

Tim: "2. As you should know, we aim to eradicate income tax., so the comparison does not hold."

See above - I'm a single taxer. No income tax here either. It is a tariff on employment and trade. Though I would say that if a local community decided mutually to have a local tax on incomes or sales to finance some mutually agreed local project it would be doing so in competition with neighbouring communities that perhaps were not or were charging a different rate or a different tax. Tax competition is good, in itself, isn't it? Also I am aware of some "single" taxers who would justify retaining some income tax at least temporarily in order to try to address the "embedded" historical advantages of monopoly ownership. I don't.

Tim: "The problem comes when some local area under the influence of whomsoever, adjusts taxation on land they wish to gain access to because a new development is coming. So, building a road, whack up the value of land next to it. Farmer has no CAPITAL to develop it, so has to sell it for a knock-down price because he HAS to sell to meet the tax bill. If this does not concentrate land into a few hands, I do no know what would. This is just one example of the potential risks."

This appears to be Churchill's "market gardener" bogey, or, to others, the "poor widow" bogey. If you look at it under the current system, that same farmer, in similar circumstances is perfectly able, regardless of the squalor growing around, to sit on that land, not paying anything and watch its value "ripen" until the value, created merely by excluding others from what they need to use, is so great it becomes irrational not to sell. That process is outright extortion.

In fact, under an LVT system, land values at the margin would tend to move much more incrementally in any case. In the absence of other restrictions - zoning, green belts etc (it is your policy to remove those restrictions once an LVT system proves practical isn't it?) - you would not get these large leaps in hope value. I would actually retain green belts and such like for a while after LVT was implemented so that it can have its greatest effect in turning existing urban land to its most efficient use before going for sprawl. But I am prepared to be convinced on that. After all, we know that at relatively low densities compared with what planning guidance seeks nowadays, it would take up less than three quarters of one per cent of the non urbanized land in England to build the three million new homes predicted to be necessary over the next twenty years.

But once a point of equilibrium was reached between supply and demand rents at the margins of production would move slowly and via the democratic influence of the market. If that market and the community that makes up its participants eventually get as far as that farmer's land and all that remains to bring it in from the margin to profitable development is to develop a road, the farmer will have had plenty of opportunity to see it coming long before the tax bill becomes an issue for him.

Tim: "3. Living costs - if you have CBI as described you would still keep the most expensive parts of the Welfare bureaucracy - the entire means-testing apparatus. Housing benefit would probably remain in all but name."

I disagree. But I don't think what you understand me to have described is what I think I have! ie, in particular, that I am not paying for CBI out of income taxes, but out of the community collected rent on economic land. Land at the margins tends as I said towards a nil value. More people will be able to own their home because they will not be borrowing twice as much as the value of the capital good (the building) in order to pay the land value in up front capital. Renting a basic home at the margins ought to be achievable out of the Citizens Income.

With so many pulled out of poverty anyway by not having punitive benefits withdrawal regimes that reduce the marginal value of doing even the smallest amount of paid work and by the reduced costs of living owing to tariff eradication and the better off keeping more of their own money, the capacity of private charity or local mutualism to assist the much smaller number of people that would be needing top up hand outs above their CBI would be much increased.

Tim: "4. Income. You need to clarify here - are you saying that COMPANIES have 40% more or that wage earners do? Be under no illusions, if you have CBI, income tax will be enormous. I worked out once that if we went for CBI with no other tax changes but a cull of QANGOs, income tax would need to be about 64% flat from the very first penny (IT is currently £140bln, 7k x 50m = £350bln pa). A HUGE disincentive to working especially at the lower end. Result: black economy, unproductive citizens, more companies shutting down and a growth in imports (and do not say "cheap imports make us richer" because that only holds if we are simultaneously exporting a greater amount of higher value exports)."

I hope you'll agree that that objection is moot given I am not talking about income taxes at all. My calculation of the CBI cost at £5200 pa for adults and a decreasing proportion for under-18s to 20% for 2 year olds is around £285bn. £245bn if only the adults. I reckon there was about £200bn a year's worth of economic rent in residential land alone at the recent peak of the market. I don't think it is beyond belief that there's another £85bn in commercial, industrial, retail and, possibly, agricultural economic rents.

Tim: "5. Movement to low tax areas: A company will consider workforce supply as a prime consideration, not just rental costs. If that were not the case, expensive London would be empty. People pay top dollar for London rents because of a massive pool of labour - they can gain access to many cheap or more chance of snaring the best. To think LVT would make a company move out to a depressed area? Those places are already cheap. Why doesn't it happen now? Limited skilled labour pool. As you say the Government does it now and did it in the past (remember the Hillman Imp?) and it creates quasi-soviets. If LVT has an influence, it might IMHO move a few companies, deter some from even setting up where they need to and the rest of the companies will be bled paying higher rates just to keep near the labour pool they require. In the case of London, the move will be to New York or Hong Kong and we all lose out."

There are so many issues in this paragraph I can only assume again that I have failed adequately to have explained my position. At the moment businesses pay rents, yes? In an LVT system they will still pay rents. The only difference is that whereas currently the entire rent, that which accrues to both the building and the site or location goes to the current landowner, ie it is enclosed, privatized. Under an LVT system, the same rent is due (assuming they were paying the market rent originally), only the portion of it that accrues to the location goes to the community and that attributable to the building to the building owner. There's no corporation taxes, no more employee taxes. There's no increasing of rent or rates; there's no bleeding anyone. Except those, as landowners, who have bled the rest of us for centuries.

Areas of low land value will also be areas in which it is cheaper for employees to live (lower LVT for them too). For a business operating at the edge of profit it would seem to me to be quite an attractive move. But one that remains in London because their key skills are there is not penalised by that. Indeed, if sufficient other businesses do it who do not need to be in London for optimal profitability do move, costs will also likely fall for those left behind, increasing their profit, distributable to capital and labour.

I think there is, in particular, one form of LVT that could have a significant effect in this regard...the auctioning of air-space, via "landing slots" at airports. Making more efficient use of regional airports would draw business into those areas. I'm likely to propose this to our regional conference this autumn as part of an "anti third runway at Heathrow" motion. Interesting choices of examples though - Hong Kong of course is famous for having state owned land - everything except the Anglican Cathedral is leasehold and that has been used to raise revenue in a form of LVT and keep income taxes low. Modern valuation tracking and billing systems would make that far more efficient and not prone to some of the problems Hong Kong suffered by having too infrequent valuations.

In China before Mao took over, I understand that Chiang Kai Chek's regime looked into LVT as a way of staving off the rise of Mao's totalitarian collectivism. And in the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev I believe looked into LVT as a way of capturing the value of natural resources and in not implementing it allowed the so called "oligarchs" (really "kleptocrats" in my opinion) to enclose the revenue from that vast pool of common wealth.

I'm getting a bit tired here! I'm going to call it quite at this point and maybe think some more about the issue of mutualism. I think Paul answered the point about the "state as landlord" objections quite satisfactorily and there's no need for me to repeat it. But for fairness, other readers can read Tim's further points in the comments on the previous post.

Tim: "p.s. your page has a script that my browser asks me to kill due to risk of resource hogging."

Yes - I only notice this on older machines or slower network connections - I never experience the problem at home or at work. I think it must have been an advertising panel I have just removed, but if others still experience the problem let me know and I'll have another look.

In my last post I set out what I considered to be the three necessary reforms to create a more equitable society - Land Value Tax (or "The Single Tax"), Citizen's Income and Ownership for All.

In the comments, Tim Carpenter, Head of Policy at the Libertarian Party UK had several objections that I would like to address:

Tim: "LVT can seem fine and dandy at the first off, but over time who decides the future value of your land?"

Why does anyone need to decide the future value of your land? In any case, even if that were necessary the market does that anyway even at present - what people pay for a property reflects their view of what it's worth into the future - they are, literally paying up front, to the previous owner, the rent for a number of years into the future. I agree there are issues with a "100% Land Tax" where the community attempts to collect 100% of the rent (as I and other geo-libertarians would advocate). This would make the capital land value tend toward zero and how would you know whether it's moving up or down over time? Well, the answer I believe is that it would trade at a discount or premium reflecting the buyer's and seller's view of whether the "passing rent" (ie the LVT bill) was set too high or too low.

Tim: "It is fraught with risks, opportunities for corruption and chaos. If you think compulsory purchase was bad..."

As I understand it several of the big RICS member firms have discussed this and have proposed a valuation regime that they would be comfortable bidding for and would expect to be able to handle things like appeals. The Oxfordshire pilot study showed that on average there was only a need to value about one site in ten - ie that that many nearby sites would share the same land value. And there are developing ever more sophisticated data and models for modelling things like "landvaluescape" and how it changes in reaction to things like new infrastructure.

I only don't believe it is as daunting a task as taxing incomes in the multitude of ways we currently do.

Tim: "If CBI is only half what is needed to live on, then surely we will still need welfare."

The Joseph Rowntree report I mentioned included a lot of things that go much further than the "basics needed to survive" (and the headline figure of £13,400 was "pre-tax". Not that I claim that would halve the bill. However the removal of the deadweight loss created by the other taxes that would be repealed, and the ending of subsidies, particularly on agricultural land and other tariffs on the necessities of life would make them cheaper. Two ways to be wealthier - have more money or make everything you need cheaper. As Frank Gallagher in "Shameless" says "Make poverty history; cheaper drugs now!"

Tim: "Removing the minimum wage is fine but be under no illusion, the CBI will be factored into that wage (or lack of)."

But, first, they would also be factoring in the lack of payroll taxes and income taxes - they'd have nearly 40% more in their "wage bill" to play with in many cases. Second, the CBI has two purposes in my mind - one of them is to give people enough to survive, just, day to day, but the intentional beneficial effect of that is that people have a cushion that empowers them to say "no" to a coercive deal from an employer. If the marginal benefit from working x hours for y pay is not worth it and you know you can survive until you get another, hopefully better, offer, this changes the balance of power between employer and employee. And, because it is the same for all workers, and not just the ones currently stuck in the benefits trap, the employers are more likely to have to listen and produce decent remuneration. Though I do concede that there would be hundreds of thousands of currently civil servants in the job market to depress wages...:)

Tim: "It will be no solution to poverty AFAICT and your assertion that it would eradicate x y or x is not explained. I think parish provision is an interesting one, but frankly, look at places like S Wales and you will find that parishes will have little or no wealth creation so no money to spend on their army of dependants - central funding will be needed in precisely the places where people say it causes problems of unconditionality - for once the parish is spending other peoples' money the problems are right back with you again."

However, the LVT is more likely to move economic activity to areas where companies, and employees, and therefore also companies as employers, will pay less tax, which is turn will raise the economic activity in poorer areas and tend to level out regional disparities of economic activity. It cannot be any worse than the current situation where some regional economies make up more than half of their regional GDP from state handouts and subsidies to individuals and businesses.

Tim: "As another person has mentioned, the mutualist company can occur NOW. What is to change here? The fact that it does not happen now should either make you ask what stops it legally/financially or regulatory OR that it is actually a factor of how humans are socially, in that it takes certain individuals the gumption to kick start a company (and that is NEVER to be underetimated) and once they do so, why would they then let a whole load of strangers take just as much out of it as he/she does?"

I certainly don't underestimate the setting up of a company. I have been an employer for precisely one month in my life and it was a bloody nightmare. But it would certainly be less troublesome if I was not burdened with all those damn tax calculations! But again, I refer the honorable gentleman to the answer I gave a moment ago - the "cushion" that empowers the employee to say "no" a bit more; to hold out for a better share of the total returns to a business. This of course goes to the core of mutualism as I see it, as opposed to the anarcho-capitalist type of libertarianism. Mutualists believe that the current capitalist system is lop-sided, "toxic" and that it is itself a coercive and damagingly hierarchical system. Empowering labour to hold out for a better deal, making use of new corporate forms like limited liability partnerships and so on, will accelerate this change.

...and finally...

Tim: "Monetary reform and changes to fiat issuance will not happen by itself. The problem is coming up with something to replace it that actually works. I have seen many attempts and none appear to work or are just a cover operation for hatstand ideas like "social credit"."

As I think I said in response to another comment, I'm actually quite agnostic about how monetary reform should happen and what direction it should take. Personally I like the Hayek idea of fully privatised commercially competing currencies. I am told that the legislation actually already exists to allow commercial "complementary" currencies run by corporations. Air miles, Nectar and Kit-Kash are but early examples.

But consider this - if you collect 100% land rent and the capital value of land falls towards zero, the structure of the money system is bound to change - a large proportion of our broad money is lent into existence to pay for land in the form of mortgages. At the very least banks are going to need to have to adjust to that.

Actually I believe the real question is what lengths states will go to to prevent what I see as inevitable change if we allowed it. I haven't played there for a long time, and the hype about it seems to have died down a lot, but "Second Life" and "Kiva" are but a glimpse of what might be to come.