geo-libertarian

"State intervention distinguishes capitalism from the free market." So writes Kevin Carson in the preface to his "Studies in Mutualist Political Economy" (2004).

In the rather broad and straggly family tree of the children of liberty, I have come to describe myself as being on the "Mutualist" branch. In fact I really married, or perhaps was adopted, into the Mutualists somehow, having started out as one of its first cousins, a "Georgist". Hence my use of that slightly affected double barreled description on this blog - a "Geo-Mutualist". But, apart from the vague notion that this denotes a position somewhere on the spectrum of views variously described as "classical liberal", "radical liberal", "libertarian" or "anarchist" - or simply "liberal" by those brave enough to face down the howls of derision from some people in certain modern soi-dissant liberal political parties not so far from here - most people react somewhat quizzically to the term "Geo-Mutualist", if at all.

So it's about time I think I tried to explain it a little. Indeed, the name having been suggested to me a couple of years ago following a previous attempt on here to put a label on my political position, it is probably only now anyway that I capable of beginning to tell you what it all means. And even now my thoughts are continually developing and changing: which is, of course, a jolly good reason for insisting on the freest of free markets in which we can express our millions of daily changes of mind every time we need to trade with someone, rather than the once every four years or so we might get to change our minds about our elected dictators.

Mutualism is, most simply, a form of anarchism. We want no political state. Not a small state, a minimal state, a night-watchman state. Just no state. It is no exaggeration to say that we believe that the state is the root cause of all inequity in the world and all coercion in an unfree market. We believe that the truly free market - all the voluntary, non-coercive, co-operative, mutually beneficial transactions between free individuals - delivers the maximum and most just distribution of economic benefits to all its participants. We believe that it is the state that by its interventions (often, admittedly, with the best of intentions but always inept at best and downright, deliberately and inhumanely destructive at worst) makes markets unfree and unable to deliver a just outcome for all its participants. That in the language of the factors of economic production "capital" and "land" can only exploit "labour" by "harnessing the power of the state in their interests" (Carson, ibid., Preface).

Put more simply it is because of state favours on their behalf that capitalists and landowners get disproportionately rich and workers remain disproportionately poor. We note that this has been the case throughout the history of the state and in all types of state, notwithstanding that some of them, such as contemporary "liberal democracies" profess to act, because elected by them, in the interests of all "the people". And, partly at least, precisely because it has this observably inevitable tendency, whichever type of state or epoch of state one looks at, we believe the state has, ultimately, no possibility of rehabilitation - and because those who set themselves up for positions of power in those states, so obviously also personally benefit from their ineptness and downright criminality.

Now most of this creed could be cut and pasted into that of most libertarians and anarchists I have come across. Hell, even Kevin himself said that he thought the major strands of the anarchist-libertarian family were often quite "porous". I have spent more time reading and listening to Austrian school thinkers over the last year and othre than emphasis, there's little, at least in the "ends" of what I have written here that they could not subscribe to, even if they differ in approach and emphasis. Mutualism's pedigree, for sure, would be described as the "left" wing of the family tree:

In the mid-nineteenth century, a vibrant native American school of anarchism, known as individualist anarchism, existed alongside the other varieties. Like most other contemporary socialist thought, it was based on a radical interpretation of Ricardian economics. The classical individualist anarchism of Josiah Warren, Benjamin Tucker and Lysander Spooner was both a socialist movement and a subcurrent of classical liberalism. It agreed with the rest of the socialist movement that labor was the source of exchange-value, and that labor was entitled to its full product. Unlike the rest of the socialist movement, the individualist anarchists believed that the natural wage of labor in a free market was its product, and that economic exploitation could only take place when capitalists and landlords harnessed the power of the state in their interests. Thus, individualist anarchism was an alternative both to the increasing statism of the mainstream socialist movement, and to a classical liberal movement that was moving toward a mere apologetic for the power of big business. (Carson, ibid., Preface)

But Mutualism is also a mechanism by which we hope to reach our ideal society. Like the nineteenth century radicals - both liberal and later in the labour movement - we want to do something about it. We want to build alternative, voluntary, non-coercive, institutions which can then be shown to produce the sort of "public goods" people currently seem to believe only the state can provide. We also want to build and encourage alternatives to the corporate hierarchical system to show that a multitude of different types of economic actors can compete in that ultimate free market - after all, there must also be a free market in the types of organization that operate in the free market!

So in my case, this may be grand objectives, such as Oxfordshire Community Land Trusts, aiming to develop affordable housing without state subsidy, controlled by the communities they are part of and the occupants who will be buying a stake in them. Or Community Finance Partnerships attempting to reduce the relaince of local businesses and households on the mainstream state-capitalist banking sector. It may also mean things like the recently reported idea of an estate in Portsmouth (a copy of which I cannot now find) to hire its own private security force, exasperated by the lack of performance of the state police. But it is certainly also applicable to small initiatives such as the Braziers Park community in Oxfordshire. And obviously this goes hand in hand with campaigning for the state to stop doing things that simply do not need doing too - pursuing the war on drugs, erecting artificial borders and so on.

So that is my quick and dirty introduction to Mutualism. I can hardly do better though than Kevin Carson's own introduction at the Mutualist website:

INTRODUCTION

   Mutualism, as a variety of anarchism, goes back to P.J. Proudhon in France and Josiah Warren in the U.S. It favors, to the extent possible, an evolutionary approach to creating a new society. It emphasizes the importance of peaceful activity in building alternative social institutions within the existing society, and strengthening those institutions until they finally replace the existing statist system. As Paul Goodman put it, "A free society cannot be the substitution of a 'new order' for the old order; it is the extension of spheres of free action until they make up most of the social life."

   Other anarchist subgroups, and the libertarian left generally, share these ideas to some extent. Whether known as "dual power" or "social counterpower," or "counter-economics," alternative social institutions are part of our common vision. But they are especially central to mutualists' evolutionary understanding.

   Mutualists belong to a non-collectivist segment of anarchists. Although we favor democratic control when collective action is required by the nature of production and other cooperative endeavors, we do not favor collectivism as an ideal in itself. We are not opposed to money or exchange. We believe in private property, so long as it is based on personal occupancy and use. We favor a society in which all relationships and transactions are non-coercive, and based on voluntary cooperation, free exchange, or mutual aid. The "market," in the sense of exchanges of labor between producers, is a profoundly humanizing and liberating concept. What we oppose is the conventional understanding of markets, as the idea has been coopted and corrupted by state capitalism.

   Our ultimate vision is of a society in which the economy is organized around free market exchange between producers, and production is carried out mainly by self-employed artisans and farmers, small producers' cooperatives, worker-controlled large enterprises, and consumers' cooperatives. To the extent that wage labor still exists (which is likely, if we do not coercively suppress it), the removal of statist privileges will result in the worker's natural wage, as Benjamin Tucker put it, being his full product.

   Because of our fondness for free markets, mutualists sometimes fall afoul of those who have an aesthetic affinity for collectivism, or those for whom "petty bourgeois" is a swear word. But it is our petty bourgeois tendencies that put us in the mainstream of the American populist/radical tradition, and make us relevant to the needs of average working Americans. Most people distrust the bureaucratic organizations that control their communities and working lives, and want more control over the decisions that affect them. They are open to the possibility of decentralist, bottom-up alternatives to the present system. But they do not want an America remade in the image of orthodox, CNT-style syndicalism.

   Mutualism is not "reformist," as that term is used pejoratively by more militant anarchists. Nor is it necessarily pacifistic, although many mutualists are indeed pacifists. The proper definition of reformism should hinge, not on the means we use to build a new society or on the speed with which we move, but on the nature of our final goal. A person who is satisfied with a kinder, gentler version of capitalism or statism, that is still recognizable as state capitalism, is a reformist. A person who seeks to eliminate state capitalism and replace it with something entirely different, no matter how gradually, is not a reformist.

   "Peaceful action" simply means not deliberately provoking the state to repression, but rather doing whatever is possible (in the words of the Wobbly slogan) to "build the structure of the new society within the shell of the old" before we try to break the shell. There is nothing wrong with resisting the state if it tries, through repression, to reverse our progress in building the institutions of the new society. But revolutionary action should meet two criteria: 1) it should have strong popular support; and 2) it should not take place until we have reached the point where peaceful construction of the new society has reached its limits within existing society.

And finally, a note on the "Georgist" side of my political family tree.  As I said, I came to Mutualism through Georgism.  I saw that Henry George's "Single Tax" was a way, not least for George himself, of significantly reducing the size and reach of the state.  Ultimately I got to the position where the state might only collect and redistribute land rent as a community dividend.

Obviously within the Mutualist ancestry with Proudhon and Tucker there are strident views also of the place of land in creating and perpetuating an inequitable society.  Tucker and George indeed had a long running correspondence and though they disagreed on George's remedy to the "land question" there can be no doubt that all the main stream branches of libertarianism put addressing this "land question" as a high priority until the second third of the twentieth century.

As I mentioned, I have been reading a lot more Austrian school stuff lately and am gaining an appreciation of their logic for a strong ethos of private property, and whilst I can see that some of the measures the Austrians would implement would reduce the inequities in land ownership substantially (different means and emphasis to similar ends again) I still think there will always be a "scarcity rent" to land that deserves a system such as Henry George's to mitigate it best.

It's a matter of emphasis really: if one day I am persuaded that the biggest economic hurdle we face is the fiat money system, perhaps my more strident Georgism would recede a little, but for the moment I certainly still believe that these problems are at least as important as each other, and because land is something over which we have ultimately less control - we have one planet after all, for now and we cannot base economic policy on the possibility that we will one day find another one suitable - I tend to say that the land issue is the more important one to solve.  So to that end, I still maintain the moniker "Geo-Mutualist".

I am a "land taxer".

Some people seem to believe one cannot be both. On the one hand, we find people like Lib Dem Matthew Huntbach, who in the comments to this Lib Dem Voice piece on my opposition to the suggested "Mansion Tax" claims that as a self-described libertarian I am likely to drop the idea of land taxes, however much I may talk about them (much more than him I'd wager but there we are) as soon as the opportunity to enrich what he thinks of as my fellow wealthy libertarians allows. For the record, I don't think that I know any truly wealthy libertarians or anarchists, and indeed I know of not a few who, despite being not very well off at all, subsisting on benefits, campaign actively for the destruction of the welfare statist system that seems to sustain them at the moment. On the other hand, we find lots of other libertarians who resolutely refuse to accept even as libertarian those who would appear to want to "confiscate" the value of private property in land they hold as a near sacred element of libertarian thought.

Now I realize that one blog post by an insignificant in Oxford is not going to settle this argument once and for all. Far better economists and political theorists than I have tried. But it is a personal battle for me, because it was the ideas of Henry George that brought me to libertarianism - for his is a libertarian idea, in direct response to the "land question" raised by so many in the history of liberal and anarchist thought - from Locke, Paine, Proudhon, Spencer, Mill, and the individual anarchists Spooner and Tucker. And it is as I have heard, read and hopefully understood more by the likes of the Austrian school market anarchists that my views on George's "single tax" solution have been challenged. Yet I still hold them.

First, a bald statement: I do not believe there are many libertarians of whatever branch or flavour (and we are truly a Baskin-Robbins ideology on that score, whatever the misinformed Lib Dem detractors believe) who do not appreciate that there is an issue of equitable access to land - that which has historically been called the "land question" by many (including Murray Rothbard [pdf] even as he criticized Henry George's solution to it). Sure some place more emphasis on it than others - but I really believe that any who denies there is any issue has not thought terribly deeply about it. I'd go further - that before the early part of the twentieth century it was a touchstone of most or even all of the emerging theories of libertarianism and anarchism; that the four "great monopolies" - of land, of money, of intellectual property and of government - that the individualist anarchists and mutualists described were commonly held to lie at the root of the inequity caused by the statist systems of privilege which they wanted to smash.

It may be that it is merely a difference of emphasis. George, for example, like Proudhon believed that the land monopoly was the "mother of all monopoly" and that solving that, for Georgists as for Proudhon, will tend to render the other three insignificant. When we sat down to discuss the content of the Lib Dems ALTER's recent book "The Case for a New People's Budget" I wanted it to include pieces on the money system and intellectual property but one of the other editors, a better schooled Georgist than I felt that such was completely unnecessary, since solving the land question would solve these others.

On the other side, the Austrians today believe, perhaps, that the fiat state controlled and cartelized money system is at the root of monopolistic behaviour and that sorting that out will render the others nearly insignificant. To this extent, whilst we acknowledge there are other problems, if all we are saying is that sorting this one or that one out first will resolve those others, we are, by different means, aiming at the same ends, of equitable economic distribution of scarce goods.

Others still acknowledge that there is an historical problem - that most land title ultimately and historically descends from aggression or statist privilege - such as monarchs kicking off serfs to give rewards of land to favoured courtiers, or the state sanctioning enclosures without any recompense to those who required the land to maintain life and limb. And they might suggest, as in the excellent introduction to libertarianism by Morris and Linda Tannehill - "The Market for Liberty" (available here as a free audiobook) suggest that at the advent of a truly libertarian society such ancient titles would be revoked since they would be next to impossible to prove and that everyone would have to stake their claims anew. But to me this resolves the problem as a "one off" and not the ongoing problem that land distribution necessarily is given the propensity for populations to change and land requirements with them.

Since it is as a result of hearing Hans-Herman Hoppe on the "Idea of a Private Law Society" nearly a year ago now at last year's Libertarian Alliance Conference that I have become more interested in "full blown" non-state ideas, it is, perhaps naturally, to the Austrian School and in particular the Mises Institute that I have turned to learn more; devouring several years' worth of podcasts of the Mises University series, but also listening to various contributers to the FEE's Freedom University series. And whilst they do indeed talk very little about land, I can glean some of the following with which I find myself in agreement that relates to the "land question" in their thinking:

• If we did not have the corrupting influence of inherently inflationary and statist fiat money there would be much less speculative froth in the system to be ploughed into land values.

• If we did not have state controlled zoning and planning restrictions, more land would be made available as development was needed and land values elsewhere would tend to fall.

• If we did not have state enforceable land titles, we would have to find another mechanism for protecting our rights of ownership of land which would tend to release land that land owners felt was uneconomic to protect compared with the utility they got out of holding it.

• And, I really do appreciate the arguments in favour of the protection of private property (well, I'd rather, after Proudhon, say "possession" than "property") being the mainstay of a civil society, that without which original appropriation and therefore economic production would be all but impossible. And allied to this I feel a sense of unfairness that someone who has, in the Lockean term, "mixed his labour" with "land" and thus brought it into production in the first place, might find that simply because others have later agglomerated around his far-sighted piece of appropriation, he would be subject to paying rent on it that may price him off it.

But...and you knew there would be one...what I cannot get round is the idea that, whilst anarchists anathematize taxation as confiscation of the legitimate product of labour and therefore an attack on Lockean self-ownership, the rental value of land is really a tax on everyone else who cannot use a particular location, even though they may have a more productive capacity to use a particular piece. All of us pay for the monopolization of locations of better quality in terms of our needs, than what we are then forced to settle for. If we have to live further away from work, we pay in time and travel costs to get past those locations that would serve us better. These values feed into land values. It is not merely that land value increment is unearned by the land-owner, but it costs the rest of us in like measure. And it is a huge burden - in the UK it amounts perhaps to about a third of what is the salaries portion of GDP. This effect, whilst it may be smaller if all the other Austrian remedies above were implemented, would never, in my opinion, disappear.

Austrians, of course, reject the value theories on which this hypothesis of land values is based - the labour, or cost theories of Smith, Ricardo and other Classical Economists. They prefer their subjectivist or utilitarian theories based on the work of the likes of Carl Menger and Eugen von Böem-Bawerk. And, whilst I also do not agree with a wholly unmodified labour theory, I am becoming more and more convinced by the likes of Kevin Carson's critique of Menger's and Böem-Bawerk's criticism of the Classical cost theories in his "Studies in Mutualist Political Economy" - which is just as well since I describe myself as a "mutualist"!

On the other hand, I am with the anarchists in that I do not want a government or quasi-government institutional structure to value and collect such "rent". And so I am attracted to ideas such as those of geo-libertarian Dan Sullivan in the US, of how it could be handled by a voluntarist system of community management companies. And it is on his ideas that I think can be developed a system that fits with both the Georgist aims of collecting land rents and the anarchist aims of not having government structures impose taxes on us. In his essay "Are you a Real Libertarian or a Royal Libertarian" he says, toward the end:

Can't we do this without the state?

There are, in fact, proprietary communities operating on the single tax model. Arden, Delaware, with a population of 4900, has had no local taxes since 1900. The Arden Corporation collects a fair market rent on each land parcel, which is reappraised annually. (They actually collect only about a fourth of the rent to which they are entitled.) From that they not only pay for all the municipal services, but rebate all property taxes levied by the county and school district.

There are excellent reasons for libertarians to prefer the land trust route over the political route. Private communities can be built on explicit contracts (leases) with the citizens, can have internal democratic processes that are vastly superior to electoral democracy, can be far more flexible and free of state intervention, and can be downright profitable (even with trust investors pocketing a mere fraction of the rent). Most of all, dealing with investors is far more pleasant and self-affirming than dealing with politicians.

But what worries me about this approach, taken literally at least, is that we might end up with one agency acting as a local monopoly that becomes a de facto government, just like Nozick says that private protection would combine into one agency with a monopoly in an area (though I am yet to read "Anarchy, State and Utopia" - I bought it and promptly lost my copy! - and so haven't read his arguments, I instinctively disagree with this as an inevitable outcome) and be to all intents and purposes a coercive albeit limited government.

However, I think there is a resolution. Admittedly I have not gone into this too deeply as yet. I have not followed all the economic incentives through the processes. It is based on the idea that in a "private law society" (necessarily the case of course in a no-state anarchist system), defense of one's life and property would be handled by competing insurance, protection and arbitration agencies.

In the absence of a single, state-provided, system of land titles, one's ability to hold onto a piece of land (that is, not to fight for, but legally to defend one's right of occupancy against any other claims) would usually be handled by your insurance and protection agencies. Of course, you could opt out, but then you would have to pay for such physical protection and legal protection against claimants by yourself and on a simple division of labour basis it is likely to be more cost effective joining with others via an insurance and protection agency system. But your premiums would likely rise to be something similar to the market rent value of the location - because it is on that basis that other possible claimants would be likely to be basing their claims on. If your insurance agency were a mutual agency operating with profit policies, they would effectively disburse the equivalent of the statist "citizen's dividend" to the members with with-profit policies.

Here, there could be competition. My insurance agency would make a (probably class action on behalf of all their clients inconvenienced by your monopoly holding of land that costs us money to avoid) claim against yours, yours would pay up and that would go into the profits of my insurance firm for distribution to the with-profits members. And these firms could compete across whole areas of productive land. So, for example, you couldn't have only those in expensive locations in Mayfair joining together and insuring against each other and effectively doing so cheaply because you're hardly likely to lay claim to your neighbour's similar property if it's going to cost you money and you're both pretty happy with your lot and are not costing each other anything by your occupancy of neighbouring sites. My firm may be based in Sutton or Dagenham and have most of its clients there, but will still be likely to be making claims against yours.

Eventually it is likely that these individual claims would not be processed at all, but that reciprocal arrangements between these agencies would spread premiums around amongst them such that the dividends paid to each one's clients would tend to even out, but all the same, the claims mechanism would remain available where there were disputes, just as, for land taxers operating within a state system, there would be tribunals to adjudicate on land value disputes.

UPDATE:  I've thought of perhaps a simpler way of understanding this - it might be looked on as competing land registries paying each other premiums for recognizing and upholding each others' clients' titles.  Does that make sense?

As I say - I have not followed the economic incentives right through such a system. But I think it contains the germ of a possible solution that does not rely on confiscatory quasi-state bodies but does equitably distribute the values created by and paid for in other ways by all who need to use land within an agglomeration area.

Remember please, this is a genuine search for a reconciliation between two sets of ideas with which I generally agree but which in contemporary libertarian discourse seem to be all but irreconcilable. But if you've read this far, I'd love to hear your responses.

Just a brief post to recall that today, 29th April, is the hundredth anniversary of David Lloyd-George's 1909 "People's Budget". Thanks to the wonders of the interwebs you can now read the whole budget online.

He ended (the main section - in the "Balance Sheet" section) with these words which have stood for a century accusing his successors of all parties for not having solved the problems he set out on the road to do:

"This, Mr. Emmott [in the chair of the Ways and Means Committee to which the budget was addressed], is a War Budget. It is for raising money to wage implacable warfare against poverty and squalidness. I cannot help hoping and believing that before this generation has passed away we shall have advanced a great step towards that good time when poverty and wretchedness and human degradation which always follow in its camp will be as remote to the people of this country as the wolves which once infested its forests."

[from "Balance Sheet": Budget 1909

From the financing of the newly created Old Age Pension and Disability insurance to the funding of the preparations for real war in the form of spending on Dreadnought battleships there was much for Lloyd-George to find in his budget. He didn't miss a trick, and more or less anything that could conceivably be taxed was, in many cases for the first time, taxed.

But for many of us it is for what ended up not being taxed that this budget is most remembered. The debate surrounding this budget, with speeches up and down the country by Lloyd-George himself and more notably perhaps Winston Churchill, must be one of the best documented in history, for it was a first attempt to implement some permanent form of Land Value Taxation. A tax shift that Churchill described as:

"the new attitude of the State towards wealth. Formerly the only question of the tax-gatherer was, "How much have you got?" We ask that question still, and there is a general feeling, recognised as just by all parties, that the rate of taxation should be greater for large incomes than for small. As to how much greater, parties are no doubt in dispute. But now a new question has arisen. We do not only ask to-day, "How much have you got?" we also ask, "How did you get it? Did you earn it by yourself, or has it just been left you by others? Was it gained by processes which are in themselves beneficial to the community in general, or was it gained by processes which have done no good to any one, but only harm? Was it gained by the enterprise and capacity necessary to found a business, or merely by squeezing and bleeding the owner and founder of the business? Was it gained by supplying the capital which industry needs, or by denying, except at an extortionate price, the land which industry requires? Was it derived from active reproductive processes, or merely by squatting on some piece of necessary land till enterprise and labour, and national interests and municipal interests, had to buy you out at fifty times the agricultural value? Was it gained from opening new minerals to the service of man, or by drawing a mining royalty from the toil and adventure of others? Was it gained by the curious process of using political influence to convert an annual licence into a practical freehold and thereby pocketing a monopoly value which properly belongs to the State—how did you get it?" That is the new question which has been postulated and which is vibrating in penetrating repetition through the land."

[From "The Spirit of the Budget", a speech given in Leicester in Sept 1909, recorded in Churchill's own memoirs "Liberalism and the Social Problem" and put online by Project Guttenberg.

When at last the Finance Bill of 1909 was rejected by the House of Lords (an action that led directly to two General Elections and the eventual imposition of curbs on the Upper House's power in the form of the Parliament Act 1911) Richard Cobden's comments in the Corn Laws debates in 1845 had come to its most extreme conclusion:

"For a period of one hundred fifty years after the [Norman] Conquest, the whole of the revenue of the country was derived from the land. During the next one hundred and fifty years it yielded nineteen-twentieths of the revenue. For the next century down to the reign of Richard III it was nine-tenths. During the next seventy years to the time of Mary it fell to about three-fourths. From this time to the end of the Commonwealth, land appeared to have yielded one half of the revenue. Down to the reign of Anne it was one-fourth. In the reign of George III it was one-sixth. For the first thirty years of his reign the land yielded one-seventh of the revenue. From 1793 to 1816 (during the period of the land tax), land contributed one-ninth, from which time to the present [1845] one-twenty-fifth only has been derived from the land. ...Thus, the land which anciently paid the whole of taxation paid now only a fraction. ...The people had fared better under the despotic monarchs than when the power of the state had fallen into the hands of a landed oligarchy who had first exempted themselves from taxation, and next claimed compensation for themselves by a corn law for their heavy and peculiar burdens."

Source: School of Co-operative Indivdualism, Quoted authors on the land question

The course of that "implacable war against poverty and squalidness" was set and as we know today, continues now and will continue until we learn to stop taxing production and honestly gained incomes and start instead to undermine the fundamental inequities of the economic system that traps so many in inescapable poverty, as people like Lloyd-George, Churchill, J S Mill, Henry George, and many of the individualist anarchists of the nineteenth century, like Benjamin Tucker knew only too well.

A century is long enough - real poverty reduction will never be achieved by redistributing the power of real economic growth but in eradicating these fundamental inequities that prevent people from bettering themselves. Alistair Darling, you have no hope of matching Lloyd-George. Learn from them, or give it up!

I am reminded by Henry Law's blog also that this month sees the 350th anniversary of the take-over the Diggers under Gerard Winstanley of various bits of land across several counties of the south of England and south Midlands.  Later in summer sees the anniversary of their arrest and removal.

There's been an awful lot of terminologically inexact harrumphing going on all week, in no small part I hope egged on by my contributions to the "debate" within the party. The "debate" that is, about neo-Thatcherite Tory entryist libertanarchist corporate shills who are either a. trying to capture the soul of the party for their wicked ends or b. seriously deluding themselves that it is possible to persuade the Lib Dems to be a truly liberal party.

What I have learned this week is that:

• My unknown father must have been a Tory, perhaps even one of those grandee types who gets to tup one of the milk-maids for his fourteenth birthday just to make sure he's not one of those left-footers that needs to be put away in a military school.
• I must have, unbeknownst to me, been a closet Con all my life until waking up one morning and thinking "hey, I know, the best place to promote my arch-conservative ideas would be in the liberal party, I think I'll join them and make my life difficult."
• Either that, or I have come under the evil influence of such closet Tories since I joined the party, possibly closet Tories with names like Smith, Ricardo, Paine, Spencer, Mill or Henry George, and "double agents" such as Fred "Why I am not a conservative, no wait, I really am...or maybe not" Hayek. Or ideas from such evil closet Tories speaking from beyond their graves.
• I shouldn't be in the party, because I believe in a world "in which no-one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity".
• I should be in the party, because, erm, I believe in a world "in which no-one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity".
• I want to have carnal relations with an octogenerian former Prime Minister and a dead former US President in tribute to the fact that they are the true leaders of my global conspiracy theorist ideology. Possibly some kind of spit-roast arrangement. Perhaps filmed by Ann Coulter.
• I am the willing, small dicked, narrow minded, socially inadequate gnarled goblin herald of the twin devils of inequality and wealth and their four horsemen; monopoly, capitalism, markets and MacDonalds.
• When I grow up, I'll find myself under a bed, or out of a tree, or off a trolley.

Still, this might seem to have little to do with the "five wars" and "four battles" of my title. I just wanted you to be able to read what I'm about to say knowing what some others think of me and my type.

Liberalism cannot win the five wars without fighting the four battles. In other words you cannot be a "social liberal" truly without fighting those battles the "classical liberals" first promoted.

The five wars, of course, are from the Revelations of St William, first Baron Bill of Beveridge. More precisely his "war on the five giant evils" that stalked the entire fabric of a society emerging from a devastating world war - Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. The cult of St William is observed by many in the party who use his Revelations to stake the claim that the "welfare state" in Britain was a "Liberal" invention that defines the essence of British Liberalism of the entire 20th century. So dominant is this cult at times that they may even claim that some time in that century, perhaps early on, say in 1911 or something, there was a "Year Zero" for British Liberals before which it is somehow no longer permissible to look for answers to modern problems.

The thing is, that many of the intractable problems that the Venerable Leonard and St William worked on appear to remain quite intractable. A hundred years later. When we realize this, we find this warning from the pre-year zero Liberal Anti-christ Herbert de Spencer prescient:

"To mitigate distress appearing needful for the production of the “greatest happiness,” the English people have sanctioned upwards of one hundred acts in Parliament having this end in view, each of them arising out of the failure or incompleteness of previous legislation. Men are nevertheless still discontented with the Poor Laws, and we are seemingly as far as ever from their satisfactory settlement."

...how many thousands now more acts in Parliament do we need to have, tinkering with this, toying with that, before we listen to him? The real difference between what some have called "classical liberals"† and "social liberals" seems to me to be the sort of questions they were asking in their exploration of political economy.

The classical liberals seem to have been more interested in preventing causes; the social liberals in treating symptoms. The classical liberals on the systemic problems that contribute to inequity; the social liberals in how to mitigate that inequity after it's arisen. The classical liberals say that by changing the core system, by reducing government interference, government protection, corporate welfare, and specifically by focussing on what Individualist Anarchist Benjamin Tucker and Mutualist Clarence Swartz called the "four monopolies" - the monopolies of money, of land, of tariffs and of patents we can create a far fairer economy; social liberals that the system was not simply unfair but fundamentally somehow unalterable and that we had to deal with its consequences through increased government action.

It seems to me that just at the point our Liberal party forebears were coming to understand these systemic monopolies of the classical liberals and beginning to want to do something about them, there was also a collective feeling that "these can't help quickly enough" and that the argument that won out was the one that said "we can only deal with the effects". This perhaps especially after the Land Tax was derailed by the privileged interests in the House of Lords and in spite of two general elections returning a government mandate to implement it.

And it is true that the basic principles of the two positions are, apparently, irreconcilable. On the face of it the one insists that the solution to poverty and inequity is to reduce government; the other to increase it. The one says reducing government results in greater liberty; the other that increasing government results in greater liberty. How can both be right? Well, of course, they cannot. They cannot both be the "end game".

Now, surely, if we are at all liberal, we would all agree that other things being equal, we would prefer to have less government interference in our lives and property than more interference. Furthermore, I am sure we would agree (or we would not be liberal at all but just enamoured of power over others like other ideologies) that of two solutions on offer, one which increases the freedoms of all without harming the freedoms of any would be preferable to one where the improvement for one group can only be delivered by decreasing the liberty of another group. Indeed there's even a "second place" in between those positions, one that's less bad than interfering by force in someone's freedoms in order to make something more equitable for someone else; that it is be better if the "interference" were voluntarily accepted than state enforced. The state action is always the least good of these three, because however democratically we dress it up, government is still always interference by someone else and by force. Like an S&M party we can accept that force on us of course, and some may even enjoy it, but far better not to have to inflict it in the first place if at all possible.

Classical liberalism's advocates claim we can have the former solution if we fight the big battles, the four great monopolies. Social liberals would say that at the very least, we need to be prepared to use the latter solution, the interventionist solution; most, I fear, would go further and say that a priori there are some things that only state intervention can deliver at a certain cost, in a certain timeframe and most equitably. Here the two can co-exist, to an extent. Whilst classical liberals' policies tend towards a longer term large scale systemic change, perhaps taking a generation or more to feed through, in the mean time the ongoing problems of inequity continue and their adverse consequences need to be addressed in the shorter term. But if we don't make our "end game" a more classical liberal vision of a level playing field rather than giving the uphill facing team a lighter ball, we will be doomed to continue the state of welfare we appear to have become and not the safety net St William and the Venerable Leonard envisaged. And that state of welfare is likely to get more costly, and require more interventions into other peoples' freedoms to achieve as a. our expectations rise and b. as we take more of the market's production away to pay for earlier liabilities and failings.

Whenever we see a mismatch between demand and supply, which seems to be what people mean when they talk about "market failure" to deliver something generally regarded as important to everybody's welfare, we must first check to see whether that mismatch may be caused by something actively preventing the market addressing the demand - which is, after all, how enterprise functions, by attempting to meet a demand at the right price at which the buyer and seller will mutually agree to trade.

Perhaps affording a home is an unrealizable dream for some not because they have too little money to afford one in a truly free market, but because our system subsidizes landlords at our expense making land also more expensive for everyone else in a largely unfree market. You don't want to increase government interference and bureaucracy by adding to the subsidy, but reduce the cost by removing the subsidy. Smaller government, more level playing field, social justice. Perhaps people could afford private GPs if we didn't (deliberately) create an economic rent in GPs' remuneration in a publicly owned monopoly which in turn keeps the average cost of choosing private provision up.

We must, moreover, seek evidence to prove that a given interference would be better than non-interference and private provision. We cannot rest assured that Hobhouse a hundred years ago said it was a good thing to provide a universal education actually means via a monopolistic state provider and purchaser as opposed to a private mechanism. And if the answer is that we "cannot prove or disprove it" we should assume the thing to try first is private provision. And even if we don't have private providers capable of meeting the task in the market at the moment, we should seek to create private providers (most probably as mutual or social enterprises), perhaps through seed capital if the barriers to entry in a particular market are high (or by removing the barriers would be even better), rather than create a structure that requires constant input of tax money to continue delivering.

So, it is quite wrong to say that there's no room for classical liberals, in the broadest sense, in what has become a social liberal party. Social liberalism's aims simply cannot be met unless we address the concerns of the classical liberals and their libertarian friends. And both are needed to prod the other into proving that the interventionist case is the necessary one in the likely few cases that turns out to be true.

† - in which I include, probably, what people think of as "anarchists", "minarchists", "libertarians", "mutualists" and no doubt other -ists.

There's an astonishing article in this month's Liberator magazine (available here - "Blues Under the Bed" - till the next edition comes out) decrying what it calls "intense efforts in recent years to convert the Liberal Democrats from a social liberal party into a classical liberal or even libertarian party".

It blames, largely, Tory convert entryists, wherever and whoever they are, and reasserts some of the historically dubious "right on" narrative of British Liberalism over the past century that is being promulgated also through groups like the new Social Liberal Forum. Specifically that there is no place for what they like to call "classical liberals" in contemporary British Liberalism because we're "all social liberals now".

Now, the first premise is not confirmed by my own experience and political journey. As I have documented several times now, since I joined the Lib Dems in 1997 (having come from a solidly Liberal voting family), I have myself moved from being the butt of jokes at local party AGM's about "Jock, over there on the far left of the room" who believed the state could do better than the market in many, if not most, areas of addressing people's basic needs, to almost as far the other way; that we should always have an a priori assumption that the market can provide and that ultimately this is the very basis of liberty and equity for all. And throughout that journey it is liberals, mostly British at that, that have guided my way. I am based in Oxford let's face it - a Tory free zone - so they're hardly much of an influence on my thinking!

What the author claims as evidence that the "Liberal Democrats belong firmly to the social liberal camp", in the form of the well known line in our preamble to the party constitution that we we exist to bring about a society where "no-one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity" remains, 100%, my mantra too, and that of most of the soi-dissant libertarians or similar in the party with whom I am familiar at least.

But we presumably need not remind the state-first-if-not-also-last brigade that our preamble also talks about decision making closest to the people affected (which could, and should in as many areas as possible, mean with the individual in a free market) and about fostering independence through property ownership. It talks about letting the market deliver wherever possible and the state (only?) where necessary - we just argue about what we mean by "where necessary".

And it is absolutely the case, in my opinion, that the party was "stolen from the classical liberals". But not, as some would have it, by some new brand of different liberal, called "social liberals", led by Hobhouse's ideas and continuing in unbroken line of concensus via Beveridge's, but by capitulating to the twentieth century's defining political duopoly between big state Socialism and the privilege of vested interests protected by Tories. Classical liberalism, with its friends the emerging anarchists, libertarians and mutualists, railed against the biggest monopolies of privilege and power fostered and protected by the state. And a hundred years ago this year, in his People's Budget of 1909, Lloyd-George started to attempt to dismantle this system of privilege through his land taxing budget.

Sadly, of course, this wasn't to be. Bogged down in a fight with the House of Lords over whether the elected house should get its way, the land taxes were sacrificed in the process of gaining this victory over the Peers and, with the exception of a Labour government, under Ramsay MacDonald, more or less legislatively abandoned for a century now.

Revitalizing these key issues that came incontrovertibly from classical liberalism and the early libertarian tradition holds the key to how to carve out a distinctively liberal balance between markets and state even today. To dismiss classical liberalism out of hand as these two essays appear to want to do, is to leave us with no reference point against which to judge whether the market can provide or whether intervention is necessary, and we get into a position where, illiberal in the extreme, we insist, unquestioningly, that only the state can do this or that and don't bother testing those assumptions. That way lies conformity - conformity before the monopoly of the state,

Whilst some in the "social liberal" tendency fawn over Beveridge as the father of the modern welfare state, even that, I don't believe, is as clear cut as they would have us believe. As I have written previously, Beveridge's report went out of its way, as one of its three key principles, to state that none of what he was proposing was to be implemented in such a way that it prevented or discouraged private provision going one better than the minimum safety net he proposed. And in his language of a "war on the five evils" facing the country as it came out of wartime, he clearly thought this was a war that could be won, not a system that would become master of so many welfare slaves.

So, my contention is that "social liberalism" is "classical liberalism plus plus" and that if you assume otherwise, you are headed down a road that elevates the state and its abilities far above what any good liberal should do, "social" or otherwise. I hope in the next few days to be able to launch a website which will hopefully spawn a group of us attempting to explain, in response to many of the "social liberals" untested assumptions about the ability or capacity of the market versus the state, just why a small state can be far more liberal in a positive way than the big state. And that the party should regard freedom, economic, social and political, to be indivisible and look only to violate one person's freedom where there is absolutely no alternative - a situation I would regard as rare, or perhaps even non-existent.

British liberalism without its classical liberal underpinnings is really just another variation of the state knows best socialism. Our history says we know better and if we're not proud of that we may as well be lost in the amorphous lump of centre left consensus politics. So yes, bring on a debate about whether we believe that "no-one should be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity" and let us try to show you how ignorance of the classical liberals' aims will lead us inevitably to the conformity of an overbearing state and leave everyone in greater poverty all the same.

I've been trying to get people to hear this for years now: that the huge advances already made in information and communication technology and in the speed and availability of travel are epoch changing. And there have been a few stories over the past weeks and even just in recent days that have confirmed for me that we are finally in the "last days" of the twentieth century in terms of the way we do so many things we have come to rely on.

Some may call what we are witnessing a Kondratiev Wave of immense proportions, asset bubbles, a global failure of risk management, the convergence of peoples now able to communicate instantly across the globe with half of the rest of the world's population, a concern about civil liberties and, in a much more interconnected world about how others see us and what they want to do to us if they don't like what they see.

And, as I have also said previously, this is an opportunity for far reaching liberalization of the world - remember Cobden's quote at the top of my page: "Peace will come to earth when the people have more to do with each other and governments less." Now we have the ability to have more to do with each other and need our governments less to do so for us we could realize that hope. Or, on the other hand, it could be an excuse for a slide into dark totalitarianism as governments seek desperately to hold onto the power to which they have become accustomed; and perhaps worse, seek to control the new global world in the same way and clash more fiercely with each other when they disagree.

Why do I say this now? What are the signals that we need to change things one way or another? Well, take a look at the Guardian's Corporate Tax Avoidance campaign for starters. This is something I predicted long ago - one of the most liberating things about the new world is that people can move, physically or just their economic interests, around the world almost instantly. This used to be the preserve of the very wealthy and well advised. But there's no reason nowadays why relatively modestly financially endowed people cannot do much the same. In response to the Guardian's campaign people have been screaming about the need to tighten up on this sort of thing - even St Vince has been at it.

This is dangerous, for it requires close co-operation between states into our personal affairs not seen before. Think of it - forty years ago each schedule in your UK tax return would have been dealt with by a different civil servant so no one person would know precisely your whole financial circumstances. Now we are asking whole countries to share data between them. It is economically counterproductive too. Tax competition is an important brake on state profligacy. It is right that one of the means of registering an objection to one country's over-taxing is to move your affairs, if the recipient country is willing, to somewhere that is not so profligate. The evidence of the last decade should be enough to show the multifarious, and nefarious, ways in which a determined state can take more tax whilst simpering that they are not raising headline rates. The common, international, policeman of tax competition seems to be able to do economically what governments are incapable of politically.

Similarly currencies - our 95-odd year flirtation with a monetary system invented effectively especially for the rich and powerful banks like J P Morgan and J D Rockerfeller looks to be collapsing. And rightly so. It cannot be right that banks are able to take on vast international liabilities in far huger volumes of a country's currency than that country can possibly guarantee, and yet we are seeing our politicians effectively writing what are potentially vast, bankrupting, blank cheques because of that system. Not only was this very system of money invested to benefit the rich and those with access to the largesse of governments but it is now being propped up, albeit in our name, essentially to the benefit of the same people and to the disbenefit of the vast majority.

And with "civil liberties" - this, to me is the crucial one, because it is a cause celebre for many, but may of those do not see, or if they do see don't want to embrace, the idea that civil liberties cover both social and economic aspects of our lives. For those who want on the one hand to fight for tougher tax enforcement against one group yet against, say an ID database or the widespread collection and sharing of personal data, they have a problem. That data is made even more necessary by their own wishes to see everyone tracked down so that they "pay their way", or don't get what they're not entitled to. And those pressures are set to become even stronger as the mechanisms that allow us, physically or virtually, to hide our affairs from governments become easier and more widely available.

Libertarians believe there is a solution. Most of us, not just libertarians, recognize there's something wrong with "monopoly". Where we differ is that libertarians tend to see the state as not just a monopoly itself but the mother of all monopolies. A true conglomerate of monopolies with a whole plethora of arbitrary power. Others believe that state monopoly can itself be controlled by the thing we call "democracy". But, as I said previously - show me an example where the problems we are now in are not already supposedly in the hands of a democratically elected body. A democratically elected body that gave in to Rockerfeller and Morgan nearly a century ago and forced us all to accept their monopoly solution say. A democratically elected body that thinks ID cards are necessary the more efficiently to transform the management of government. And so on.

On the other hand, to libertarians (or at least some of them) I would say that you need to realize that some of your often heart-felt policies cause quasi monopolistic structures - such as with the relatively recent, in libertarian history at least, fixation with an allodial system of ownership of the planet's natural resources - especially "land".

For me, there is no doubt in my mind that liberty is indivisible - you cannot have "social liberty" without also having "economic liberty" and those who seem to try to split the two are doomed to failure, or even worse - encouraging states into that dark descent to totalitarianism by continuing to grant them the monopolistic and arbitrary powers to prosecute one type of freedom. Equally, a more securely philosophically rooted understanding of sharing our earth would enable libertarians to promote a system that was both free and fair and equitable, without a monopolistic state. If these positions can be reconciled...I'll feel fine, as REM said!

The End is Nigh Originally uploaded by Martin~

Or, why I am really a "geo-mutualist" and why I think you should be too!

The revolution has begun. In fact it's been building for at least twenty years. When history looks back it will not probably be able to identify a particular date, but it could do worse than choose Christmas Day 1990, the day a humble academic computing geek communicated with his server in something nobody had really heard of called "hyper text". Finally there was something useful to do with the "internet" that would eventually draw in users from well outside of the ivory towers and military research facilities that developed it. Users in every corner of the world; users of every age and race; users of every background.

And what will history say about this revolution? Will it be seen as a great leap in human freedoms, capable of finally fulfilling Cobden's vision that "peace will come to earth when the people have more to do with each other and governments less"? Or perhaps that it heralded an era of unprecedented interference in our lives by governments?

Actually, I think it is a one way bet; that eventually it will be a revolution in human freedoms, in co-operation and in innovation. Such are the players in this brave new world; hackers working to bust the Great Firewall of China and liberate a fifth of the world's population for example; Kenyans being the first to be able to make payments quickly and simply by mobile phone; privacy technologists working to keep us one level of information security ahead of the law; game players investing ever more realistic virtual worlds; their individuality and very lack of co-ordination in many cases makes it inevitable.

What politicians can do, however, is either to make the transition long and painful, or to smooth its passage for the "good of mankind" so to speak. We can choose to stick by the state and try and keep it working just as its citizens are less and less tied to it, which will inevitably lead to more and more monitoring and restrictions; or we can choose to look at how to build alternative civic institutions and mechanisms to fulfill our needs in an era when the state has much less power to intervene at least without the force that is endemic in state action becoming more and more obvious to the point of rebellion against it.

So what is the great weapon of mass destruction that is going to bring low the state as we know it? Why, tax, of course. I'll let you into a little secret: in order to function a state needs to be able to tax: in order to tax it needs to have the ability to track transactions or peoples' wealth and changes therein. And from the taxpayer's point of view, there is every incentive to try to minimize their tax liability. Up until now, or very recently, it has been only the global super-rich who have had the means and sufficient incentive to take advantage of loopholes and allowances that enable them to choose the lowest tax jurisdiction in which to crystalize out their tax liability.

But thanks to the global and interpersonal nature of this most recent communications revolution we are on the cusp of mechanisms being easily available to the big majority of people that will enable us to minimize our "financial footsteps". When most of us only ever relate to the majority of our money through pixels on a screen or numbers on a bank statement - a small minority of trade now relies on real metal or crinkly coloured paper currency - what does it matter what those pixels are called; pounds, dollars, euro, yen? What about a completely new, essentially fictitious currency perhaps, like the "Linden Dollars" of "Second Life"?

Add e-Bay and Tesco to Second Life for example and one could imagine a world in which most of your financial transactions are conducted entirely in cyberspace, in virtual worlds that know no territorial boundaries or tax regimes (or at least that could be relocated into a sympathetic tax jurisdiction quickly if necessary), but with delivery of goods and services in the physical world. That's not to say giants like Tesco and e-Bay would necessarily be best, or would necessarily even survive the upheaval.

Those widespread international (and local) interpersonal (and business-to-business) mechanisms for sophisticated modern-day barter are now within reach and threaten the very raison d'etre of many of our longest standing institutions - banking and currency, transnational corporations built in an era when intermediaries were necessary to trade with far off lands, and ultimately the basis on which the state is founded - its monopoly of taxation. At the same time we can form non-geographic communities of genuinely voluntary co-operation in which we can build trust relationships, quasi-legal ways of dealing with disputes and so on that make trade possible with people a few short years ago we would have never had a hope of even communicating with.

So, which side are you going to be on - freedom and co-operation or ever more intrusion, regulation and restriction? And how long have we got?

Some of these technologies fall into the category of "overestimated penetration at 2 years, underestimated at 10 years." I think the state will be lucky if it has another decade of relatively easily collected taxes based on productivity, sales and incomes. If people want the state to be able to function beyond that, without increasingly authoritarian intrusion into our economic lives, we need to be looking now at how to make it pay its way through user fees for any value for money services we want it to provide. And as soon as it does of course it must also open itself to competition - else it's a monopoly again whose only rationale is to use its discretionary power to rip off the very people who both fund and use its services.

Unsurprisingly any of the various forms of land value tax will do to start with and would be especially beneficial implemented soon, near the bottom of the crash in land values currently underway. The present situation in financial markets offers an ideal opportunity for new means of trading without the sort of money so invidiously inflated and deflated by the banking cartels. Again, these alternatives could operate either on a local scale or in an international, or non-geographic trading community. Land has the singular benefit of being immoveable. You can't virtualize land as easily as you can income - for we all still need to have a base somewhere.

There's another major reason for helping this process away from the power of and dependency on nation states rather than fighting it - the state is expensive. The sort of redistributive measures required to ensure that everyone gets a fair crack at opportunity - the level playing field - are getting more and more expensive. Our interventions into the affordable housing market for example, in the form of subsidy, will continue to rise when land values rise, subsidizing the already-haves in the name of assisting the have-nots. Far better to try to ensure the fairest of level playing fields for all than trying to play uphill on a steepening playing field.

So, when you find me criticizing the state and its acolytes, it's less about what has gone on in times past - I would say times of missed opportunity for sure - but more on how we will be able to live in future, a future I think is pretty inevitable, in which the very idea of a state with the power to tax fairly will be severely compromised. The elephant in the room needs to be dealt with, and dealt with soon. Will it be freedom, or more desperate attempts to maintain the ailing state structures? You choose!

We've seen much over recent weeks about how awful the City has been. How banks have made rash dodgy loans. Short sellers, overpaid executives and whatever else...

But I'll let you into a little secret: for every loan there is both a lender, perhaps a dodgy spiv with too high a bonus to be sure, but just as importantly there has also to be a borrower.

We have seen a little po-faced political bemoaning of the culture of consumer debt, but this unsecured credit - spending money - does not appear to be the primary debt that has caused this collapse. With few exceptions, when the banks talk about the sub-prime loans lying like a half-dead half-back at the base of a maul, they are talking about mortgages. Are not these borrowers to be condemned in equal proportion? Did the bankers force them to borrow? Are not they just as greedy, in their own way, as the bankers making themselves rich on those borrowers' seeming insatiable demands for more money? Maybe these are the real "sub-prime loons" that are really responsible for bringing our economies near to systemic collapse?

Of course it would be electoral suicide to lay so much blame on the ordinary "Joe Sixpack, the hockey mom". And indeed it would be quite wrong to do so. For most of those mortgage borrowers, perhaps especially what has become known, horribly disparagingly, as the "sub-prime" borrowers, were being completely rational. Rational, that is, in an utterly irrational system. And the results of that rational behaviour are now serving to highlight just how irrational the system is.

Indeed, it is so utterly irrational a system that those borrowers we might want instinctively accuse of being the least rational - those whose chances of paying off the large loans were the smallest - are in fact the most rational. Because in that mad upward spiral of house prices, those still left renting would be the worst hit. The urgency of getting out of renting and fixing your future housing costs at today's rates is all the more pressing.

Because here's the second little secret for tonight: we all rent.

This may seem counter-intuitive in a world where 70% of folk "own" their home and most of the rest want to. If you are, or can recall when you were, on the point of making the transition from renting to buying the first time, this will be easier to understand. One of the factors in your decision to stop renting and to buy instead will have been whether the mortgage payments, as compared with your current rent payments, are reasonable value, over the length of time you expect to be needing to use that property.

Of course there are many other factors as well. Some in favour of ownership, such as being able to improve, redecorate or even trash the property, and having the prospect of capital growth. Some in favour of renting, such as not being responsible for all the maintenance, or not being stuck with a mill stone if you can't sell it when you need to move. And of course the supreme benefits: a. you don't need to charge yourself rent - after all you are paying for it anyway and b. if you get to the end of your payments okay, you get it rent free for as long as you like and still get to sell the rights to it hopefully at a tidy profit.

But as tradable assets, our properties are valued on the basis of the yield it could achieve to an investment buyer now, and their view of how that is going to change over the time they expect to hold the investment. And when we buy a home, what we are actually buying is the right to collect the rent on that property for several years ahead at a "fixed" price today that we think will benefit us. Few owner occupier buyers will probably think about it that clinically. They might instead look at local comparisons to assess what they ought to be willing to pay. But so long as there is a rental market, and since there are some disbenefits to ownership as noted above it is likely that there will always remain a rental market, the money-value to the market is going to be based on its current and future rental potential and the overall yield over the time an investor would expect to hold that property investment.

So, what rising house prices indicate is that investors believe that there are going to be higher returns in terms of future rent potential. And if you are still a tenant, higher returns to the landlord mean higher costs to you. So if it is economic to freeze the rent payments at or near today's levels for the foreseeable future, you definitely want to do so. This becomes a bubble because the effect of future expectations compounds itself. Throw in relatively cheap loans and people can afford more in the present to secure those expected future gains.

Okay, now having, I hope, got you thinking in terms of "rent" I want to get you thinking about the different components of this "rent".

Take two identical, some might call them identikit, homes. Two same model "Barratt boxes". Only one is in Kensington & Chelsea, the other in Blaenau Gwent. I choose them because they are the highest and the lowest respectively local authorities by "land value" in England and Wales. Three bedroom, 100 sq m and with a rebuild cost of £1500 per sq m. On the face of it, they ought to cost about the same to buy, somewhere around £150,000, but of course they don't, do they.

If you managed to find the same little plot in K&C as in Blaenau on which to place your "Barratt box" you'd probably find that in Blaenau it would cost next to nothing - probably a couple of thousand pound per plot, for the trouble of clearing it! But in K&C it would cost several million and probably wouldn't be worth your while putting that Barratt box on it! In fact, in the recent purchase of Chelsea Barracks by the Candy brothers, which was reported as £959m for 12.8 acres, your average tenth of an acre plot would set you back a cool £7.3 million.

In fact, the Chelsea Barracks site is a good one to look at, since it will not involve criticizing the "poor widow" for not developing her prime land, but the government! What did the government, the Ministry of Defence do to make that barracks land so valuable? It certainly wasn't its former use as a barracks! It's not because it was a barracks that makes it an in demand site. But because of all the economic and social activity that goes on around the site. In fact, once upon a time, as a barracks, no doubt the site would have attracted the usual motley collection of military hangers on - whore-houses, bars and so on - it may even have depressed local land values initially, but certainly for the past few decades holding it out of its more productive use has meant other local prices have been pushed higher than they would be if all that land had been used productively.

In fact, the proportion of the "rent" due to the value of the building, the same sort of building as in Blaenau, is a tiny fraction of the overall rent. The rest is due to the location. The popularity of a location which is made up of dozens of factors, but centres around the fact that there are hundreds, thousands, of people who could beneficially make use of that location to be nearer work, social and other opportunities created by the surrounding community.

Now, here's the easy part to remember. What Land Value Taxers want to see, from David Ricardo, Adam Smith, J S Mill, Henry George to Lloyd-George, Churchill, Asquith and many others to the present day, is that the portion of the rent a property yields due to its location, and not the building on it, should be collected by the community and redistributed amongst the community instead of privatised by the highest bidder (or in some cases still the person with the most brutal land grabbing ancestor!), shored up by cheap bank loans. It is rent due to its monopoly as a good location that many people could make use of rather than any effort of the landowner.

In an LVT based tax system, when you "buy" your home, you'd be buying the right to collect the rent for the building alone. This is something you as an owner can affect, through your diligence or negligence in maintaining it or in building something of higher density on the same site. In the language that a typical home buyer will understand better, we want you to pay the £150,000 for the Barratt box to Barratt or the previous occupier, but you pay the remainder, the rent caused by its location, in annually assessed chunks, to the state instead of paying taxes on the earnings from your economically productive labour.

You can already, I hope, see the advantages. This bubble we have lived through over the past decade, the angst of people priced out of the market stressing about if they ever will get out of renting, the ballooning of borrowing that now threatens the very system that created it, will be things of the past. For as long as you can justify paying the location rent given the benefits that particular location gives you nobody can shift you. If that rent rises it is a sign that more and more people are being excluded from land that they might make more productive use of than you. Why should you be able to exclude them for as long as you like and then also reap a massive profit from having cost so many others much money "avoiding" your plot?

Instead of that home in Kensington & Chelsea costing you £7.35 million up front, it'll cost you £150,000 or so up front, which you can borrow to pay for if you need to, and a hefty annual location rent bill instead of both the remaining £7.2 m mortgage it would have cost you to buy the location up front and your income and other taxes on productive labour. Your disposable income is likely to be maybe 30% higher just for losing those income taxes. You can save in a wider range of productive assets for your future than just the monopolistic endeavour of owning a popular, or up and coming location. You may even choose to save so you can continue to pay the location rent when you stop earning for whatever reason - though most would probably find it just as good to save for an income in retirement and to downsize or move so that someone else can have the benefit of the local school you no longer use, the local rail station you no longer commute from and whatever other factors have made your location a popular one and for the proximity of which you would continue to pay even after you have stopped using them.

In the lingo, this is called creating "free land". Returning it to common ownership and paying as you go to occupy the bit that most suits you at any particular time of your life.

Even apart from the source of government revenue this would provide (though some of us would prefer to see the rent collected and simply doled out to all citizens in that community as a community dividend, a basic universal non-withdrawable income in place of most cash benefits) it fundamentally shifts the burden away from working and producing and onto inefficient use of scarce resources.

It is essential in an environmentally responsible regime, because it makes the choice of whether to live close and not pollute by commuting or to live far and spend a fortune in travel costs, more available to more people.

And it is essential in a liberal regime, as it gives people a choice in the "taxes" they pay - the tax savvy will soon work out that if they can spot an up and coming area that still meets their needs early they will pay less tax and watch the services there get better as others catch on, until it reaches some kind of equilibrium again. And it stop people making monopoly profits out of excluding others from what we all need access to - a location to base ourselves at.

This would be so much more than just a "tax switch" though - it would so fundamentally change the fairness, equit, economic justice for millions of people who, knowingly or not, are trapped in a system that takes money from them to line the pockets of landowners, the ranks of whom are getting ever more distant for many people all the time.

One of the most common points of disagreement between, let's call them "state-interventionists" and "non-interventionists", is the claim that "non-interventionism" would leave the poorest in society on the scrap heap with no welfare, no support. That the much vaunted idea of "non-interventionists" that "private charity" or "voluntary co-operation" would take the place of state welfare is just an impossible pipe dream. So determinedly do "state-interventionists" believe their own claims that they frequently castigate "non-interventionists" as heartless uncaring selfish individualists who would rather see others die than pay taxes. One quote from a Lib Dem Voice "discussion" just today will give you the general idea:

"Well none of them [Libertarians] are serious, because it an incoherent philosophy....send the kids back down the mines, it’s only a lifestyle choice."

And to an extent, I used to believe that propaganda. As a geo-libertarian of course I do have an answer of sorts - the basic income derived from land user fees (which would on their own create an almost unimaginably more equitable society in any case) would cover the basics of life for everyone, and give everyone an incentive to top it up with as much or as little work as they can manage.

But a recent discussion on a "non-interventionist" mailing list I've been frequenting recently has challenged the basic assumption of this debate for me. Would people really not contribute voluntarily to the upkeep of others if you don't have a government apparatus threatening them with the confiscation of their property and ultimately the loss of their freedom unless they pay their taxes?

It is a strange proposition. Governments for at least the last sixty years have been supporters at some level or another of some form of state welfare. They may argue about how much is appropriate but the fact is, people have overwhelmingly voted for a state that takes money from you in order to give some of what's yours to someone deemed "less fortunate". We even have a cliche about the inevitability of death, and taxes.

We have tens, maybe hundreds of thousands of people who do voluntarily give up their time to care for another. Most people are someone's relative, someone's friend, someone's colleague. And whilst I recognize that some do not have such support networks and would still require some form of collective support, most people do not want to see their friends and relatives on skid row or worse.

One has to wonder whether the interventionist route actually makes things worse. And in how many ways. When we look at our pay packets do we not think often that we've given quite enough for the support of others through our taxes thank you very much. National Insurance and Income Tax between them effectively make the worker near forty per cent worse off. I know what I would do with an extra forty per cent each month. It would pay the interest bill on the piece of land we have just acquired for our first Community Land Trust for a start.

Other taxes and protectionist policies keep the prices we pay for basics artificially high and create incentives for companies to produce cash cows rather than exciting developments. I'll bet if we didn't guarantee one pharmaceutical company a contract for however many millions of doses of Metformin diabetes pills every year a dozen others would have put the effort in to find a cure, not a chronic treatment regime.

The attempt to do welfare as a "universal" system, with the same rules for everyone, means a bloated bureaucracy enforcing inflexible regulations. If welfare were, say, to be dealt with at the parish level, and the barriers to job creation caused by taxes eradicated, I'll bet you more people would be found some work, appropriate to their abilities, even if it didn't give them everything they need and then people would feel much better about helping them out with the rest - because they were trying to help themselves as best they could. We have no way of measuring that at a national level really.

We have a Professor here at Brookes, a chap called Steven King. His area is the History of Welfare mostly in the 18th and 19th centuries - probably the period which received wisdom says was the harshest environment if you were poor or hapless. But I was fascinated by a lecture he gave a couple of years ago on being elevated to the professoriate (you are elevated to that aren't you?). Apparently when parishes were responsible for pensions, those who actually got a pension - those whom their own peers and neighbours if you like knew had simply tried and been unable to support themselves (in common parlance I guess the "deserving poor") would get on average 75% of the average working wage for their area. For others there were varying levels of support down to a pretty basic safety net that was intended to be subsistence rather than comfortable for those they felt were "swinging the lead".

And then there's the problem of administrative costs. If I had an extra 40% in my pay packet and was going to give it away, I'd know that the people or organizations I was giving it to would get all of my donation. I'll bet for the 40% the state apparatus take off me in taxes, probably half actually gets to someone who needs it, to direct service delivery, if that.

So, given all those disadvantages of, and the singular advantage that people actually vote for, this tax based welfare system at some level or another, is it not just possible that by doing away with all that coercion, all that centralization, all that unproductive bureaucracy, the people who get to keep what they earn would be quite proud to "do the right thing" by their neighbours and communities? If they vote at the ballot box to have money taken off them by the state for things they obviously believe are necessary, would they suddenly feel they were not necessary or that they should not contribute towards those same things without the threats of the state?  Isn't that a totally illogical position?  You'd vote for it but not do it if the people you vote for didn't force you to do it?

And so, at the very least, would it not be at least a courtesy to accept that Libertarianism is an optimistic creed; that it is positive about humanity's innate ability and even need to help each other. You may call that a naive optimism. But I'd rather be a glass half full freedom lover than the glass half empty authoritarian approach that says humanity will not help itself unless it is forced to do so by the agents of a state apparatus that may, just may, cause more problems than it actually solves. Libertarian is not a "devil may care/beggar thy neighbour" philosophy but one that places the utmost faith in people, as individuals, to know and do what is right.

And as to whether it is a "coherent philosophy" or not, I submit that "non-interventionism" is the only truly coherent philosophy in the game. For once you admit the state can do one thing better than we can through voluntary co-operation, you inevitably end up in endless arguments between factions about just how much the state can do better, and the ultimate end of that arms race is totalitarianism - that the state can do everything better than voluntary co-operation. Which is manifestly not true.

Again, I'm starting a new post to respond to some very interesting comments by Tim Carpenter. My inept attempt at a Drupal template means it's almost possible to follow a thread of comments and especially given this is going to be another long response I think it deserves an airing on its own.

For anyone coming new to this debate, it follows on from my original "three point plan" for equity and economic justice and some clarifications and responses I gave yesterday to comments on that original by Tim Carpenter, Head of Policy at the Libertarian Party UK.

Tim, thanks for taking the time to respond. However I think we are, as a colleague used to say to me "talking past each one another". Paul Lockett has put it all a deal more eloquently than myself , and for that, and if I have caused any confusion, apologies.

I am a geo-libertarian (of the "geo-mutualist" variety if you will). The main thing you seem not to have appreciated is that in calling for the "Single Tax" I mean just that - the community/state can only take economic rent on the land resources within its jurisdiction and has no call on incomes or trade. As I understand it this is the "purist Georgist" position.

The ideal 'state' would be limited to collecting the rent and distributing it all as a dividend to citizens for the reasons Paul outlined. "Commonwealth" - you are right, it's lazy, I should put a space between "common" and "wealth"! Economic rent from the finite natural resources we all require to share is "common wealth" and should be collected as such and distributed as fully as possible whilst every other tax is a tariff.

Tim: "1. When I say who defines the value of your land, you say "why does anyone need to decide", yet immediately go on to talk about collecting the tax! Someone DOES decide the taxable value and that affects the actual value. Can you not see that?"

No, the market sets a location's value. It does it all the time at the moment. And it will continue to do so in an LVT system. Even in a "100% LVT" system. If a location is appreciating in value, buyers will be prepared to pay a premium over last year's rent bill and vice versa, in a falling market sellers will effectively have to be prepared to pay someone to take the rent bill off them. The following year's rent bill will reflect that premium or discount by going up or down respectively.

Tim: "2. As you should know, we aim to eradicate income tax., so the comparison does not hold."

See above - I'm a single taxer. No income tax here either. It is a tariff on employment and trade. Though I would say that if a local community decided mutually to have a local tax on incomes or sales to finance some mutually agreed local project it would be doing so in competition with neighbouring communities that perhaps were not or were charging a different rate or a different tax. Tax competition is good, in itself, isn't it? Also I am aware of some "single" taxers who would justify retaining some income tax at least temporarily in order to try to address the "embedded" historical advantages of monopoly ownership. I don't.

Tim: "The problem comes when some local area under the influence of whomsoever, adjusts taxation on land they wish to gain access to because a new development is coming. So, building a road, whack up the value of land next to it. Farmer has no CAPITAL to develop it, so has to sell it for a knock-down price because he HAS to sell to meet the tax bill. If this does not concentrate land into a few hands, I do no know what would. This is just one example of the potential risks."

This appears to be Churchill's "market gardener" bogey, or, to others, the "poor widow" bogey. If you look at it under the current system, that same farmer, in similar circumstances is perfectly able, regardless of the squalor growing around, to sit on that land, not paying anything and watch its value "ripen" until the value, created merely by excluding others from what they need to use, is so great it becomes irrational not to sell. That process is outright extortion.

In fact, under an LVT system, land values at the margin would tend to move much more incrementally in any case. In the absence of other restrictions - zoning, green belts etc (it is your policy to remove those restrictions once an LVT system proves practical isn't it?) - you would not get these large leaps in hope value. I would actually retain green belts and such like for a while after LVT was implemented so that it can have its greatest effect in turning existing urban land to its most efficient use before going for sprawl. But I am prepared to be convinced on that. After all, we know that at relatively low densities compared with what planning guidance seeks nowadays, it would take up less than three quarters of one per cent of the non urbanized land in England to build the three million new homes predicted to be necessary over the next twenty years.

But once a point of equilibrium was reached between supply and demand rents at the margins of production would move slowly and via the democratic influence of the market. If that market and the community that makes up its participants eventually get as far as that farmer's land and all that remains to bring it in from the margin to profitable development is to develop a road, the farmer will have had plenty of opportunity to see it coming long before the tax bill becomes an issue for him.

Tim: "3. Living costs - if you have CBI as described you would still keep the most expensive parts of the Welfare bureaucracy - the entire means-testing apparatus. Housing benefit would probably remain in all but name."

I disagree. But I don't think what you understand me to have described is what I think I have! ie, in particular, that I am not paying for CBI out of income taxes, but out of the community collected rent on economic land. Land at the margins tends as I said towards a nil value. More people will be able to own their home because they will not be borrowing twice as much as the value of the capital good (the building) in order to pay the land value in up front capital. Renting a basic home at the margins ought to be achievable out of the Citizens Income.

With so many pulled out of poverty anyway by not having punitive benefits withdrawal regimes that reduce the marginal value of doing even the smallest amount of paid work and by the reduced costs of living owing to tariff eradication and the better off keeping more of their own money, the capacity of private charity or local mutualism to assist the much smaller number of people that would be needing top up hand outs above their CBI would be much increased.

Tim: "4. Income. You need to clarify here - are you saying that COMPANIES have 40% more or that wage earners do? Be under no illusions, if you have CBI, income tax will be enormous. I worked out once that if we went for CBI with no other tax changes but a cull of QANGOs, income tax would need to be about 64% flat from the very first penny (IT is currently £140bln, 7k x 50m = £350bln pa). A HUGE disincentive to working especially at the lower end. Result: black economy, unproductive citizens, more companies shutting down and a growth in imports (and do not say "cheap imports make us richer" because that only holds if we are simultaneously exporting a greater amount of higher value exports)."

I hope you'll agree that that objection is moot given I am not talking about income taxes at all. My calculation of the CBI cost at £5200 pa for adults and a decreasing proportion for under-18s to 20% for 2 year olds is around £285bn. £245bn if only the adults. I reckon there was about £200bn a year's worth of economic rent in residential land alone at the recent peak of the market. I don't think it is beyond belief that there's another £85bn in commercial, industrial, retail and, possibly, agricultural economic rents.

Tim: "5. Movement to low tax areas: A company will consider workforce supply as a prime consideration, not just rental costs. If that were not the case, expensive London would be empty. People pay top dollar for London rents because of a massive pool of labour - they can gain access to many cheap or more chance of snaring the best. To think LVT would make a company move out to a depressed area? Those places are already cheap. Why doesn't it happen now? Limited skilled labour pool. As you say the Government does it now and did it in the past (remember the Hillman Imp?) and it creates quasi-soviets. If LVT has an influence, it might IMHO move a few companies, deter some from even setting up where they need to and the rest of the companies will be bled paying higher rates just to keep near the labour pool they require. In the case of London, the move will be to New York or Hong Kong and we all lose out."

There are so many issues in this paragraph I can only assume again that I have failed adequately to have explained my position. At the moment businesses pay rents, yes? In an LVT system they will still pay rents. The only difference is that whereas currently the entire rent, that which accrues to both the building and the site or location goes to the current landowner, ie it is enclosed, privatized. Under an LVT system, the same rent is due (assuming they were paying the market rent originally), only the portion of it that accrues to the location goes to the community and that attributable to the building to the building owner. There's no corporation taxes, no more employee taxes. There's no increasing of rent or rates; there's no bleeding anyone. Except those, as landowners, who have bled the rest of us for centuries.

Areas of low land value will also be areas in which it is cheaper for employees to live (lower LVT for them too). For a business operating at the edge of profit it would seem to me to be quite an attractive move. But one that remains in London because their key skills are there is not penalised by that. Indeed, if sufficient other businesses do it who do not need to be in London for optimal profitability do move, costs will also likely fall for those left behind, increasing their profit, distributable to capital and labour.

I think there is, in particular, one form of LVT that could have a significant effect in this regard...the auctioning of air-space, via "landing slots" at airports. Making more efficient use of regional airports would draw business into those areas. I'm likely to propose this to our regional conference this autumn as part of an "anti third runway at Heathrow" motion. Interesting choices of examples though - Hong Kong of course is famous for having state owned land - everything except the Anglican Cathedral is leasehold and that has been used to raise revenue in a form of LVT and keep income taxes low. Modern valuation tracking and billing systems would make that far more efficient and not prone to some of the problems Hong Kong suffered by having too infrequent valuations.

In China before Mao took over, I understand that Chiang Kai Chek's regime looked into LVT as a way of staving off the rise of Mao's totalitarian collectivism. And in the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev I believe looked into LVT as a way of capturing the value of natural resources and in not implementing it allowed the so called "oligarchs" (really "kleptocrats" in my opinion) to enclose the revenue from that vast pool of common wealth.

I'm getting a bit tired here! I'm going to call it quite at this point and maybe think some more about the issue of mutualism. I think Paul answered the point about the "state as landlord" objections quite satisfactorily and there's no need for me to repeat it. But for fairness, other readers can read Tim's further points in the comments on the previous post.

Tim: "p.s. your page has a script that my browser asks me to kill due to risk of resource hogging."

Yes - I only notice this on older machines or slower network connections - I never experience the problem at home or at work. I think it must have been an advertising panel I have just removed, but if others still experience the problem let me know and I'll have another look.