Those of us who quite like the idea of anarchism, or to use a word I've heard used more frequently recently and which rather neatly it seems to me gets round the inevitable comparison with bomb throwing revolutionaries, Spanish priest killers or G20 violent-left credentialed academics when unsympathetic folk hear the "hot button" word "anarchy", "voluntarism", are frequently goaded with taunts such as "look at Somalia, look at how great your ideal of anarchism is doing there (not)! Explain that if you think anarchism is such a great alternative.". Or even "why don't you go live in Mogadishu if you think anarchism is so good?"
Well in the past I have really tended to wave away such taunts with something along the lines of "that's not really a great example of the sort of thing we mean, because it only arose out of the complete and unplanned collapse of a previous totalitarian regime with no time, as we would want to have if we were deliberately introducing anarchism here in a developed country, to develop those alternative sorts of institutions that we would probably expect to replace state run public goods like security and rule of law."
Nonetheless it is an example of a country that has been essentially stateless for much of the past two decades, and which continues to be in the headlines now and again, whether over piracy, as recently, asylum seeking or the scene of a shambles of a US attempted invasion popularized by a Hollywood action adventure blockbuster. So I figured it deserves a closer inspection. Also, though, as I grow ever more impatient to sack all the politicians and bureaucrats that currently are making such a destructive hash of ruling us, I think it is actually an interesting experiment to consider how it might pan out here if we were to manage to achieve an unplanned revolutionary change.
The first thing to consider is what expectations we should have when looking at Somalia as such an example. Those who taunt supporters of voluntarism with Somalia seem to expect a miracle and are trying to suggest that voluntarism has obviously failed because people dont't live forever, all drive around in Bentleys, have rosy cheeked children dreaming of graduating from the world class University of Mogadishu into world leading management consultancy firms and have the highest standard of living on the planet. But this is to mistake the claims made for the superiority of voluntarist statelessness. We only claim that in a cost-benefit analysis statelessness would do better for any given group of people than a statist society. If somewhere was more or less a shithole with a government we would want it of course to be less of a shithole without and, one would hope, on a trajectory of development and improvement that would see it advance more quickly and to a higher level than with a government. We would, I think, agree that to expect somwhere to go from armpit of the planet to surpassing the standard of living of some Monaco style playground of the world's wealthiest would be unreasonable. Wouldn't we?
So, can such claims for the superiority of statelessness be demonstrated by the Somali example? Well, before considering that a little history of the place is called for. Let's face it, Somalia was not merely in the "bit of a shithole" category in the years preceeding the period of statelessness: it was one of the worst. Even in a period when there were rivals such as Congo's Mobutu vying for the title of the regime with the worst record on human rights, the era of Uganda's Amin and other such paragons of sound government sharing the continent, that of Siad Barre in Somalia was described by the United Nations as "one of the worst". Barre had run a totalitarian "scientific socialist" regime for his first ten years and then as the western aligned powers tried to butter him up to end his reliance on the Soviet bloc he had slowly introduced a few economic, in the main reforms.
He was still a complete bastard. In a country with a clan system that goes back millennia he was ruthless in persecuting those of clans other than his own. There was massive corruption and lotos of world aid ending up in the hands of his favourites. "Gossip" was a capital offense. Not that you would notice it since his internal militia just killed people they didn't like the look of anyway. He had complete control of the media - with just one state owned newspaper for example. There were hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people as he made frequent land grabs to give to his friends and more refugees over the border in Ethiopia. Of course we didn't hear so much about all this because those who would speak out were terminated before they could.
Apart from the short nine year period between independence from Italy and Britain in 1960, Barre's rule was pretty well the only time this "counry" had existed as a monocentric governed state. These two colonial powers had suppressed traditional clan based polycentric natural and property law based justice systems that had survived successfully operating for eleven hundred years regardless of which Caliph had claimed what bits of the territory.
So, has the ensuing statelessness made things better or worse? And if better, has it been better than what might have been expected had a more controlled, humane, government been in charge? Well, first of all, you probably wouldn't consider the immediate aftermath of Barre's overthrow an "anarchy". It was a state of civil war, in which those warlords who had collaborated in overthrowing Barre fought to get to form a new government. But when that fizzled out in stalemate, despite interventions from the "international community" on one side or another, real statelessness set in. Of course quite a number of the positive studies of the benefits of the statelessness are by people with something to prove about anarchism - libertarian authors who could be said to have a bias toward showing statelessness in its best light. But I'd encourage you to read this one by Austrian economist Peter Leeson - it's only 33 pages of double line spaced text and appears quite methodologically sound to me.
Nonetheless, the World Bank (in a report co-authored by Tim Harford), The Economist, the BBC and National Geographic are amongst the more unbiased positive studies of various aspects of the working of markets to provide many public goods not available under Barre's regime. Indeed the World Bank report states that "Somalia boasts lower rates of extreme poverty and, in some cases, better infrastructure than richer countries in Africa". In telecommunications, electricity generation (at least in the urban areas), air transport and financial services, sophisticated markets, unburdened by regulation (and sometimes "buying in" regulatory services such as with airlines all safety checks are contracted out to the destination countries' civil aviation regimes) have flourished and are amongst the cheapest on the continent. There is a thriving competitive media with a dozen radio and TV stations and many newspapers. Cross border cattle trade has more than doubled - and the insurance contracts required by Kenyan buyers to assure them that cattle are not stolen have lower premiums even than those paid by Kenyan sellers.
Literacy is high, even though schooling has fallen (though before 1991 all schooling was being funded by international aid money which has fallen off rapidly because the "international community" cannot cope with the idea of a stateless entity - there is no government, corrupt or otherwise, to do aid deals with. Nonetheless private primary education is taking off, and there are now three universities where there was only one. Life expectancy is higher than in its relatively "stable government" neighbours, as is access to medical care, even though it is private. Infant mortality and maternal mortality in childbirth are both lower compared with their regional neighbours.
The clan system of extended family support for the destitute has kicked back into life - so although access to safe water is lower than in its neighbours, the poorest do not pay because their clans arrange that for them. The Somali diaspora remits nearly a quarter of the entire GDP through a network of unofficial but quite sophisticated money transfer agencies operating internationally - a little like a Somali version of Western Union. Homicide is, if I understand the measure correctly, down to 4% as a cause of death, compared with 3.6% in parts of the USA.
In fact, the periods between 1992 and today which have seen most turmoil have been those in which the "international community" has taken it upon itself to say "enough is enough, you need a government and we're going to help impose one". When there is a chance of a government, the war-lords start fighting again hoping to get the upper hand. When the energy for the establishment of a government fizzles out they go back to looking after their clan based interests and leaving the others alone. The ancient polycentric "Xeer" system of clan justice, based, as mentioned above, on restitution for property loss and natural law has which was by all accounts a very humane legal system has been usurped for the moment by the allegedly more brutal Shari'a based Islamic Courts Union with its Shari'a emphasis on codified punishments and we do get to hear about summary and brutal justice being doled out on occasion. But when we consider where they have come from under Barre's brutal regime even that is an improvement.
In conclusion then, yes, Somalia is still in the "bit of a shithole" category. Yes, it confuses the hell out of governments and international organizations around the world to have a state without a government and they keep trying to interfere to impose one. It is probably not yet the sort of place you would tend to want to go for an Indian Ocean holiday, let alone to settle in some kind of a global "Free State Project". But on the basis that we claim market anarchy is not a miracle cure, but merely better than government based institutions operating under similar constraints of national natural and human capital, it certainly looks as though the period of statelessness has seen many improvements in Somalia, and improvements that have come more quickly than in comparable neighbouring countries with functioning governments.
They still face enormous challenges of course, not the least of which is the continual hand-wringing of the "international community" desperate to try and help impose some state apparatus from time to time. But maybe, just maybe, if that "international community" can refrain from attempted power-broking and limit themselves to things like trying to persuade the traditional courts system or the Islamic Courts Union to take responsibility for dealing with the likes of the pirate problem - since it would be in their interests to do so if it keeps the heavy hand of government imposed from without away from them - perhaps Somalia can continue to prove that statelessness can bring bigger faster improvement than governments can.
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