Land and Libertarians

I’ve long been wanting to try and address an issue which appears to be a fairly significant point of conflict between various people who would otherwise all call themselves libertarians. A post by our good Devil and the comments that follow it provide a good opportunity. Some there and elsewhere in libertarian groups would even suggest that those of us who subscribe to the opinion that land values are somehow not legitimate private property cannot really be libertarians at all. On the contrary, some would say even that we are crypto-communists for wanting to rob people of the yields from their landed property.

Yet it seems to have been a matter of controversy throughout the history of anarchist and libertarian thought, and both sides even invoke John Locke as the supreme expositor of property rights in support of our arguments.

But let’s start from where we generally speaking agree. We all, I think, would agree that monopoly is inimical to the free markets we would want to see. I suspect we would all subscribe to the idea that we are entitled to self-ownership, and that to a very great extent, self-ownership means the right to own the fruits of our own labour. And I think most of us would subscribe to what Herbert Spencer described as “the fullest liberty to do as [we] will compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other [person].”

I feel most of us also acknowledge that there are some problems in the historical distribution and acquisition of land and recognize that much vested interest has been created through violence or state intervention - either forcibly taking land off others as in many of the enclosures or through grant of title over others’ claims by the state favouring individuals or great families.

But that’s about where agreement ends insofar as land is concerned. It seems that most libertarians view land as a free market in which people are free to participate or not to the extent they wish - to own, to rent, whatever suits them at their time of life or financial circumstances. To use the fruits of their labour to buy up more than they can use for their own needs as an investment and charge others to use it if it has such a value. And that anything that impedes that is theft just as taking away your chattels or other property would be. In fact, I think they also feel that since, as they see it, we are inexorably moving away from dependence on land (most of us no longer have to till the soil for sustenance) the importance of land itself is diminishing and it becomes an ever more free market.

So, before getting into discussion of possible remedies, I want to set out why I think there needs to be remedies to the “land question” as many of us would call it. I believe that property in land breaches the three main tenets of libertarianism I mentioned above: it is monopolistic and therefore not a free market; it exacts a toll on the fruits of others’ labour; and as a result it denies people Spencer’s “fullest liberty…”.

First, some definitions, because I think people get quite confused about just what we mean by “land”. “Land” in the economic sense is not just the earth, the ground we walk on, the soil we till. It is the third factor of production; everything in the material universe not originally created by the application of labour and capital; resources in their “natural state”.

But more than just that, when we are talking about “the ground we walk on” we are really talking about its “location” as much as its extent. A million acres in the Dry Valleys region of Antarctica may, for all we know, have no material value whatever. The few acres of Chelsea Barracks was worth £970 million last year. Similarly, we may yet have no use, and therefore put no value on, one part of the electromagnetic spectrum, but have many competing businesses dependent on technologies that use another particular, finite, location on the spectrum. So we usually mean “land in a particular location”.

Land as monopoly. When Winston Churchill made his “speeches by the yard” on the land question in gathering popular support for Lloyd-George’s land taxing 1909 “People’s Budget” there were of course very much fewer people who owned their own homes than do nowadays. But he was also expressing the views of some anarchists, such as Benjamin Tucker, Leo Tolstoy and Proudhon, as well as Liberals such as Spencer and later Henry George, that the land monopoly was one of the greatest barriers to free markets.

Many today feel that land, especially in the form of property in housing, is much less of a monopoly if at all. After all, in a world where nearly 70% of households live in the home they own, how can it be the monopoly problem of grasping landlordism that it was at the turn of the 20^th century? But the problem of land monopoly has not gone away. In fact, because it is less obvious I would suggest it is more insidious. Every location is in effect a monopoly of its own. A monopoly of the various circumstances, services, links and other infrastructure that make it unique. If you have the only house for sale in a particular school catchment area, the only house within a reasonable distance of a transport link that will allow people to get to the nearest good employment opportunities, or any number of other factors, you have a monopoly.

By and large we can only have one occupier occupying any particular plot - okay, we can build upwards and fit more people on the same plot, but that itself is exploiting the monopoly power of that plot.

Some will say that a monopoly is not necessarily the worst thing that could befall us, after all, if someone owns all the shares in a company that too is a monopoly - you just invest in another one. If someone is the only doctor in the community they have a monopoly, but someone could start another surgery. But we all have to live somewhere. So far as I am aware, pace Patri Friedman’s “seasteading” project, we have yet to find a way of living that does not involve some contact with land - even boats have to moor somewhere once in a while.

So land is a monopoly quite unlike being the only person able to own and admire that genuine unique Picasso. Yes, others may want it, but it does not alter their ability to live by not having it.

Incidentally, it is this monopolistic quality of locations that means it is so easy to bid them up into a bubble, such as we’ve seen recently. All that needs to happen, in our debt-based money system is that the banks have got to be prepared to lend to someone more than the next bidder for the one desirable location in the area. Yes, this can encourage others to cash in and create more opportunities in an area but we remain in a quasi-monopolistic system. Those of us, which includes most libertarians I suspect and certainly all Austrians, who regard the fiat and debt-based money system as the root of all problems should be extremely worried about this monopolistic ability to talk up the price of any individual location - it is, or has been these past few years, the prime factor in enabling the creation of mountains of debt-based money.

Land exacting an unjust toll on others’ labour. If you happen not to be able to borrow enough to get you a home in the optimum location for your work, or your kids’ school, or near enough for relatives to look after the kids when you go out to work or a whole host of other reasons, you may find a place further away, but more of your labour is going to be spent circumventing those more optimal locations.

Or if you have a business, a shop say, and cannot manage to pay the rent for the optimal “pitch” where most people will pass your shop display and be tempted in, you’re still likely to have to employ the same minimal number of employees to get the work done as someone in the higher rent location, but your takings will be lower. If you look at the structure of retail rents in the UK for example you will find that landlords try and capture this difference explicitly - they try and charge a premium based on ever more complex formula for guessing what a business can make in that location.

This illustrates David Ricardo’s so called “Law of Rent” in which he discovered that rent will rise at any particular location to capture the difference between productivity at the lowest priced location relative to the one in question. The huge land values usually found nearest the most lucrative business districts of communities and cities arise directly because people who cannot afford to occupy them have to work harder to avoid those locations.

In its simplest form this is best seen just by having to spend a fortune on your season ticket, an hour on the train to work and so on. Churchill again used to tell a story about the tolls of London Bridge and the landlords of Southwark. Most people in Southwark worked in the City of London as relatively low paid workers. It was the cheapest area they could get within reasonable travel distance of work, their means of sustenance. The parish elders responsible for enacting the poor law support in the parish of Southwark noticed that though most of the community were gainfully employed over the river, they still had to hand out a lot of dole to give them an acceptable quality of life.

London Bridge at the time had a toll, and so the parish petitioned to have the toll removed so that the workers would at least have to spend less getting to and from work. They succeeded in their aim. For a while the dole required fell, but then they noticed it rose again nearly to the former levels. What had happened? The landlords of Southwark had also noted that the workers would have a few extra pennies in their pockets and put up their rents to capture it.

With developments in transport methods and so on of course it is easier nowadays to get further to work and so on, so the gradient if you like at which landlords closer to the centre of things can cash in on others’ inability to rent their locations is lower, but it exists all the same. At some point, on the outer fringes of any settlement, there will always be those locations which are only just “marginally productive’ in which the residents can only just get to work or their other needs and maintain a reasonable standard of living. Ricardo’s Law of Rent says that inside those locations rent will rise to capture the bulk of the difference between the costs of those living further out and those living closer to the centres of economic activity.

Land impinging on others’ “like freedom”. Both of these previous factors combined clearly affect those excluded from the better locations freedom to enjoy the fruits of their labour. This is where Locke comes in. Robert Nozick coined the phrase most often quoted here - the idea of the “Lockean Proviso”.

Locke had said, in his Second Treatise, that it was legitimate to appropriate as much land as one wanted, so long as one left enough, of similar quality, amenity and so on, for everyone else. He also said that we own the earth “in common” with everyone else (note - common, does not mean “collective”). If we are to have self-ownership everyone born (who has to make do with this our only planet on which to eke out a life) must have a common birthright to claim a place to do so. You cannot own the fruits of your labour if someone is always taking some of them off you just to have a place to sleep at night.

That may have been easy in the New World, where there seemed as if there were vast, perhaps unlimited, tracts of currently unoccupied land just there for the taking. But in a more sophisticated economy, one not based solely on one’s agrarian abilities (and let’s face it we all benefit from that agglomeration of humanity into bigger, more specialised, settlements), more and more people will want to settle in the same area both to contribute to and benefit from the economic activity that human civilization affords. At that point, when Locke’s Proviso is breached, and there cannot be “enough and as good left over for everyone else”, land starts to have the two qualities already mentioned - of a monopolistic, zero-sum, market and of exacting a toll on others labour. At that point it begins to have a rental value. The rental value reflects the extent to which Locke’s Proviso has in fact been breached - the higher the rent the more people could make “as good” use of a particular location and the fewer “as good” locations are available.

So that “rent” is not something the current owner “earns”, except by the purest luck of being there before anyone else, so much as something that all the other potential owners of that monopolistic location create; what they have to pay to avoid the previously occupied location.

I’ve already gone on too long in this piece to be able to go into the possible remedies to this situation. All I wanted to show in this though is the problems land in particular as a type of property creates. Problems which all are inimical to the principles of markets and freedoms that libertarians are supposed to stand for.

If the monopoly factor were not of itself enough to make a libertarian think twice about treating land, location, as a species of property worthy of different treatment from other chattels and goods, the fact that it gets its value not by any of the labour the first appropriator expends on it but because of the costs others expend having to avoid it, and the consequent limits on the freedoms of others to do as they please and enjoy the full fruits of their own labour ought to convince them.

As I said in a comment on the Devil’s blog earlier, some libertarians feel that you can’t be a good libertarian if you believe the land market needs some type of reform, I have to say that I find it difficult to see how one could be a good libertarian without acknowledging that land needs some kind of reform because the effects private ownership of rental value of locations are so opposed to the basic free market and self-ownership tenets of our philosophy.

No doubt I will return some time to try to convince you about the best remedies to these problems.